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 Since the end of World War II, the international aid regime’s ability to support large refugee 
populations has inadvertently contributed to a new phenomenon among refugee populations: refugee 
militarization. Refugee populations have militarized in countries such as Zaire, Uganda, and Pakistan 
with the aim of forcefully returning to their country of origin. Their activities have contributed to the 
diffusion and escalation of many conflicts.  
 To prevent, or at least more effectively handle, the harm that this additional conflict creates, 
policymakers must be able to identify the causes of refugee militarization. I address this question by 
analyzing three cases of significant refugee movements, and a few historical examples, to test the 
importance of specific factors on whether refugee populations will militarize. I utilize a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques for this analysis. 
 I find that the receiving state must decide that refugee militarization is in its interests and 
substantial humanitarian aid must be provided for refugee militarization to occur. These interests 
include characteristics such as ethnic ties, strategic interests, and legitimacy concerns of elites. The 
presence of humanitarian aid is a necessary, not sufficient, condition for refugee militarization. 
Characteristics of the refugee population can increase the likelihood of militarization, but they are not as 
important as dynamics within the receiving state.  
 Because humanitarian aid must be provided for refugee militarization to occur, aid organizations 
must recognize the reality that humanitarian assistance can contribute to additional conflict. This means 
there is a possibility of humanitarian assistance doing more harm than good. That reality mandates that 
aid organizations consider withdrawing or withholding humanitarian assistance as a viable policy option 
in certain situations to do the best work possible for refugees. 
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 Refugee populations have gained increasing prominence in discussions about conflict in recent 
times. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has had a budget of over $1 billion 
in almost every year since 1993.1 In 2009, UNHCR had a budget of almost $2.3 billion.2 Organizations like 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF) are also paying 
much more attention to refugee populations.  
 To be clear on the definition of a refugee, I will use the definition from the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It states that a refugee is a person who:  
 “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
 membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
 nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
 of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
 habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
 return to it.”3 
 
This definition has been complemented by including people fleeing politically-motivated harm, which 
does indeed make the definition more complete.4 
 One of the most worrying problems that can arise from refugee populations is refugee 
militarization. Muggah and Mogire list four characteristics of refugee militarization. The first involves 
militarized activity in and outside the refugee camps. The second is political activism and violence. The 
                                                          
1
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR at a glance,” Refugees Magazine, February 18, 1998, 
30-31. 
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Global Report 2009,” June 2010, 65. 
3 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
September 1, 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf (accessed March 21, 2010). 
4 Aristide Zolberg and Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the 
Developing World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
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third is military training and recruitment. Fourth is popular support for armed resistance among the 
refugees. This is an effective definition because it is clear and easy to understand. 
 I further specify that I am interested in militarization with the aim of attacking the state of 
origin, rather than militarization that engages the refugee population in a new conflict. This is because 
of the difference in dynamics between cases where the refugee population participates in the conflict of 
its receiving state and when the refugee population strikes back at the state from where it came. 
Refugee involvement in the conflict of the receiving state typically comes about due to how easy it is for 
armed groups within the receiving state to recruit the refugees. The case of Rwandan refugees in 
Uganda illustrates this difference quite well. The incorporation of Rwandan refugees into Yoweri 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) took place under very different circumstances than the 
militarization of Rwandan refugees that occurred with the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) in 1987. Hostilities from local Ugandans convinced the refugees of the necessity to organize and 
assert themselves. The refugees hoped that participating in armed resistance against the government 
would allow them a chance to secure a place for themselves in Ugandan society. Their militarization 
with the RPF occurred with the understanding that their place was in Rwanda, and that they should be 
in power there.5 Because these two situations had different dynamics, I have chosen to focus on one of 
them to maximize the precision of my analysis. 
 Muggah and Mogire draw a distinction between refugee militarization and ‘refugee camp 
militarization.’ According to them, refugee militarization is a broader concept than refugee camp 
militarization because it includes military-oriented activities outside the refugee camps.6 Hence, when 
refugee militarization occurs, refugees are actively participating in conflict. For years, refugees were 
                                                          
5
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, 159-184. 
6 Muggah and Mogire, "Arms Availability and Refugee Militarization in Africa- conceptualizing the issues." In No 
Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa, by Robert Muggah, 1-50. New York: Zed Books, 2006, 8. 
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assumed to be victims of conflict, not participators in it.7 The idea that they can actually participate in 
conflict, and sometimes even escalate or diffuse it, is extremely troubling. It has required policymakers 
and everyone involved to rethink how the international community responds to refugee populations. 
 Some people may contend that refugee militarization is an “African phenomenon.” Western 
media has a well-documented tendency to portray the African continent as being filled with violence 
and conflict, and refugee militarization fits nicely with this narrative. However, this narrative is 
inaccurate. During the 1980s, the two largest refugee populations were the Afghan and Palestinian 
refugees. The proportion of the world’s refugees originating from African countries increased from 47% 
in 1987 to as high as 70% during the 1990s, and is still quite high.8 However, the current trend of more 
and more refugees coming from African countries does not necessarily mean that they are more likely to 
produce refugees. During the Iraq invasion for example, thousands of Iraqis fled the country and 
became refugees. The current war in Afghanistan has also created a substantial refugee population, 
even if Pakistan and Iran have been more resistant to receiving refugees than during the 1980s.9 
 Another misperception is that the end of the Cold War brought about an upsurge of refugee 
militarization. In fact, the opposite happened. In 1987, almost 8 million refugees were affected by 
political violence. By 1998, that number had fallen to 4.3 million. It had fallen as low as 1.7 million in 
1997. Political violence is Sarah Lischer’s proxy for refugee militarization. Because she includes cases 
where refugees were attacked as cases of refugee-related political violence, she includes some countries 
and refugee groups in her list of those involved in political violence that I do not count as having 
                                                          
7
 Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
8
 Sarah Lischer, Working Paper: “Refugee involvement in political violence: Quantitative evidence from 1987-
1998.” Cambridge: UNHCR, 2000, 1-25. 
9
 Human Rights Watch, “Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran,” Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Pakistan, Human Rights Watch report, February 2002. 
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undergone refugee militarization. Regardless, her data does present an overall picture of fewer, rather 
than more, refugee populations militarizing.10 
 Lischer’s data beg the question of how important refugee militarization currently is. If refugee 
militarization is on the decline, then perhaps there is no need for a sense of urgency. However, present 
dynamics of many current conflicts indicate that the problem of refugee militarization could get worse in 
the coming years. A recent article in the French newspaper Le Monde pointed out that there were fewer 
repatriations in 2009 than in any year in the past 20 years.11 This observation indicates that refugees are 
taking longer to return home, and that the conflicts they are fleeing are not providing much assurance 
that they will end any time soon. The severity of the conflicts and the extended periods of exile for 
refugees increase the likelihood of frustrations building to the point where, as Myron Weiner would say, 
“refugee warriors” emerge.12 In other words, there is increased risk that refugees will arm themselves 
and participate in the conflict that they originally fled. Hence, the observed decline in refugee 
militarization during Lischer’s timeline of 1987-1998 could soon be revealed as a temporary 
phenomenon. 
 While the risk of refugee militarization appears to be increasing, it is important to remember 
that the majority of refugees, even when militarization begins to occur, are innocent and are in dire 
need of humanitarian assistance. Organizations like UNHCR, the ICRC, and MSF have been working 
diligently to try and provide that assistance. However, they have faced a common problem of 
humanitarian aid: lack of funding. In particular, UNHCR has a history of being chronically underfunded 
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 Sarah Lischer, Refugee involvement in political violence: quantitative evidence from 1987-1998, 2. 
11
 To be clear, repatriation is the term used for when a refugee returns to his or her country of origin. The article 
cited can be found here: Benoit Schaeffer, “Le monde compte de plus en plus de réfugiés ‘quasi permanents,’” Le 
Monde, October 4, 2010, http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2010/10/04/le-monde-compte-de-plus-en-
plus-de-refugies-quasi-permanents_1420242_3210.html (accessed October 25, 2010). 
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for the projects that have been deemed necessary to conduct.13 The problem is made even worse by the 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the resources that they do have. This criticism is common throughout 
the literature on development and has been extended to the literature on refugee assistance.14  
 However, the worst case scenario occurs when humanitarian aid actually makes a refugee crisis 
worse. A growing number of scholars have begun to comment on this. The most compelling explanation 
of how humanitarian aid can make a refugee crisis worse is through refugee militarization. Fiona Terry, 
Sarah Lischer, Myron Weiner, and Zolberg et al. are just a few of the scholars that have studied this 
dynamic. They have all observed that humanitarian aid has the ability to sustain refugee populations, 
grant legitimacy to strongmen within the refugee population, and become a revenue source for armed 
groups to finance their operations. In fact, large humanitarian assistance operations have existed in just 
about every documented case of refugee militarization. This means that where refugee militarization 
has occurred, humanitarian aid has worsened situations that it was intended to improve. Refugee 
militarization often does not occur when humanitarian assistance is being provided though, so it is a 
necessary condition for refugee militarization, rather than a sufficient condition. 
 Therefore, it is crucial to determine when providing humanitarian aid to a refugee population 
will contribute to refugee militarization. That determination must be made by first identifying the causes 
of refugee militarization. I will address this question and attempt to identify the causes of refugee 
militarization. Once those causes are identified, organizations and countries looking to provide 
humanitarian aid can avoid the situations where they are present. The conclusions of this thesis should 
                                                          
13
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR at a glance,” Refugees Magazine, February 18, 1998, 
30-31. 
14
 This literature is extremely vast. For a couple of examples, see William Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden and 
Robert Calderisi’s The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working. Extensions to refugee assistance can be 
found in Alexander Cooley and James Ron’s article “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political 
Economy of Transnational Action” and the Goyens et al. article “Humanitarian aid and health services in Eastern 
Kivu, Zaire: Collaboration or competition?” 
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provide improved insight for policymakers about how best to assist refugees without contributing to 
their militarization. 
II. Literature Review 
 Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo provide a history of refugee movements dating as far back as the 
origin of the word refugee in France in 1573 “in the context of granting asylum and assistance to 
foreigners escaping persecution.”15 In their history, they identify the Palestinian refugee population as 
the first refugee population to have undergone refugee militarization. In their terms, “refugee-warrior 
communities” have become an increasingly serious problem in the global refugee situation. Refugee-
warrior communities have formed because many refugee groups that have formed in recent decades 
have not been passive victims. Instead, they have developed organized political leadership and military 
structures. Their militarization has been a severe challenge for UNHCR because its already existing 
shortage of funds prevents the organization from confronting important ethical and policy dilemmas. 
 International law does acknowledge this challenge. Political activists are a common form of 
refugee, yet their political activities must be limited once in exile. The Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) refugee convention prohibits “subversive activities” by verbal means or arms in Article III. 
Furthermore, its preface includes a statement from African states that they are “anxious” to distinguish 
between refugees seeking a peaceful and normal life and those—non-refugees by implication—who flee 
“for the sole purpose of fomenting subversion outside.” Similar principles have also been articulated by 
the Council of Europe, several UN General Assembly resolutions, and in the 1967 Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum.16 
 The authors argue that a friendly base and relief assistance for the refugees are the two factors 
that allow refugee-warrior communities to develop. The friendly base has to be provided by the 
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 Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence, 5. 
16
 Ibid, 276. 
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receiving state of the refugees.17 Then, because refugees often lack the resources for subsistence 
production, they are often dependent upon aid to survive. That aid can then be easily diverted by the 
political and military leadership of the refugees. For example, the United Nations Border Relief 
Organization (UNBRO) was set up to supply the Khmer on the Thai-Kampuchean border, and the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in December 1949 for the Palestinian 
refugees. These organizations have devoted significant amounts of resources to refugees. The resources 
have sustained large refugee populations, thereby providing an implicit legitimacy to the militant groups 
tied to those refugees. Groups like the Khmer Rouge can then point to that legitimacy to justify their 
continued existence and activity, even as they divert some of the money and other resources from 
humanitarian assistance to pursue their own goals.18 
 
Potential Causes of Refugee Militarization 
 In the past couple of decades, scholars have attempted to determine the causes of refugee 
militarization. Zolberg et al. make one of the earliest attempts. Their book highlights the receptiveness 
of the receiving state to militarization and support of the international aid regime as the two most 
important factors allowing refugee militarization to occur. Their discussion of the international aid 
regime gets broadened to the international community as well. They include the diaspora of the 
refugees’ ethnic group and foreign states in their list of actors who can support militarization.19  
 Later work develops their ideas remarkably well. Sarah Lischer’s discussion of refugee 
militarization points to the type of refugee population and the response of the receiving state as the 
most important causal factors for refugee militarization. Her contribution of recognizing different types 
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 I am only looking at receiving states that are contiguous with the sending state. To my knowledge, there have 
not been any cases of refugee militarization among refugee populations that have settled in non-contiguous 
states.   
18
 Ibid, 276-277. 
19
 Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence, 275-278. 
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of refugee populations showcases which ones are the most likely to militarize and which are the most 
likely to divert humanitarian assistance to support that militarization. Unsurprisingly, these 
characteristics match. The refugee populations that are the most likely to militarize are also the most 
likely to divert humanitarian assistance.20 
 Lischer’s classifications of refugee populations include situational, persecuted, and state-in-exile 
refugees. Situational refugees have little political cohesion and therefore little motivation to divert 
refugee relief to support militarization. They have generally been driven from their homes due to war, 
natural disasters, or some other form of chaos. Once that chaos subsides, situational refugees are 
generally willing to return home. They often do not take sides, instead just wanting peace. Persecuted 
refugees are fleeing targeted persecution or oppression. This may include genocide, ethnic cleansing, or 
other violent measures. Humanitarian assistance to persecuted refugees is more likely to exacerbate 
conflict than when it is given to situational refugees. Finally, state-in-exile refugees combine a highly 
organized political and military leadership with the refugee population. The leadership often intends 
that the refugee crisis will draw international sympathy and support their war aims. They hope to return 
to the state they came from and retake power. Having a high level of political organization, state-in-exile 
groups are very good at diverting large amounts of humanitarian assistance to advance the conflict. An 
easy way to think about this hypothesis is that if the refugees want to militarize and they have the 
capability, then they will.21 Categorizing refugee populations in this manner is therefore a way to classify 
the type of refugee population as a causal factor in refugee militarization. 
 Beth Whitaker adds discussions about characteristics of the receiving state and the importance 
of those characteristics on whether refugees will militarize. Her analysis highlights the importance of the 
political legitimacy of the receiving state, level of politicization of ethnic identities, and the leadership’s 
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 Sarah Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Ithaca: 
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political calculus of maintaining power. Political legitimacy in this context is referring to whether the 
receiving state is recognized by its citizens as having the authority to govern. Present-day Somalia is one 
example of a state that does not have political legitimacy, due to the fact that many of its citizens do not 
recognize the state’s authority to govern. Politicization of ethnic identities refers to the level of division 
within the state’s politics along ethnic lines. For instance, during apartheid South Africa had explicit 
political divisions between white, black, and colored people. Moreover, she looks at pre-existing 
tensions within the receiving state. Pre-existing tensions could include actual fighting within the 
receiving state, power struggles within the receiving state, or some other turmoil. Refugees may get 
caught up in those conflicts and militarize as a result of those. Whitaker uses these factors to compare 
Zaire and Tanzania in their reception of Rwandan refugees in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. She 
finds that they are the keys to understanding why refugee militarization occurred in Zaire and not 
Tanzania. In short, Zaire had more serious pre-existing tensions and politicization of ethnic identities, a 
leader in Mobutu Sese Seko who found it much more in his interest to allow the refugees to militarize, 
and less political legitimacy as a state than Tanzania did.22 
 Two additional factors that UNHCR has suggested as causes of refugee militarization are the size 
of refugee camps and the distance between refugee camps and the border with the sending state. 
However, Sarah Lischer provides convincing rebuttals to both of these causes. In her discussion of the 
hypothesis about distance between refugee camps and the border, she shows that while Tanzania and 
Zaire both had refugee camps close to the border with Rwanda, it was only the refugees in Zaire who 
militarized. Additionally, a group of about 25,000 refugees, led by the businessman Fikret Abdic, fled the 
town of Velika Kladusa in Bosnia twice during the Bosnian War. In both flights, refugee camps were 
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 Beth Elise Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict: Contrasting Cases in Central Africa," Journal of Asian 
and African Studies, 2003: 211-231. 
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located close to the border. However, refugee militarization only occurred in the first flight.23 More 
importantly, it is just not feasible to move refugee camps very far from the border. Especially with some 
of the mass influxes that have occurred, such as in Thailand with Cambodian refugees and Zaire and 
Tanzania with Rwandan refugees, there are often too many refugees to realistically consider the 
movement of refugee camps a realistic policy option. With regard to camp size, Lischer uses the case of 
refugee camps in Zaire to discredit the theory. In the five large refugee camps around Goma, over 
700,000 refugees were housed. Bukavu, on the other hand, had 23 camps in its surrounding area 
housing almost 400,000 refugees. Yet, refugees in Bukavu’s smaller refugee camps fell under much 
tighter control by the militants.24 MSF was one of the few NGOs to make this observation: 
 “While some believed that in smaller camps the leaders would have less power over the refugee 
 population, this proved to be a mistake. The leaders, some of whom have been identified by 
 other refugees as well-known Interahamwe, wielded considerably more power over the small 
 camp population of 15,000 than their counterparts in the larger camps.”25 
The case of Bosnian refugees from Velika Kladusa supports this refutation as well. With Abdic’s refugees 
split between two camps, the camps both had refugee populations below 20,000. UNHCR recommends 
that camps be limited to 20,000-30,000 refugees, so the camps were relatively small. UNHCR argues that 
limiting refugee camps to 20,000-30,000 refugees makes the camps more manageable and leads to 
fewer social problems. The militarization of Abdic’s refugee camps, despite their relatively small size, 
contradicts this conception.26 
 The combination of this work provides arguments for the importance of the type of refugee 
population, response of the receiving state of the refugees, tensions within the receiving state, and level 
of foreign support as causes of refugee militarization. Each of these hypotheses should be more 
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 Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 118-140. 
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 Ibid, 93-94. 
25 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill, July 20, 
1995, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1467 (accessed February 14, 2010). 
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rigorously examined to determine their ability to cause refugee militarization. This thesis will begin that 
examination. I will also add a discussion of state strength. This is important because intuitively, strong 
states should be able to prevent refugee militarization within their borders. Weak states may not be 
able to prevent refugee militarization even if they oppose it. 
 
Explaining how refugee militarization influences conflict     
 When refugee militarization occurs, there are two main mechanisms through which it influences 
conflict. These mechanisms are conflict diffusion and escalation. Conflict diffusion occurs when conflict 
spreads from one country to another. Escalation occurs when additional actors get involved in a given 
conflict. These mechanisms are explored by several scholars. 
 Lake and Rothchild, in their study on ethnic conflict, argue there are four ways for diffusion to 
occur. First, events abroad can change the ethnic balance of power domestically. This can lead to 
violence by disrupting the existing ethnic contract within a country. In Zaire, the influx of Hutu refugees 
immediately following the Rwandan Genocide was an important reason for why Tutsi-related insurgents 
rose up against Mobutu Sese Seko’s government. In Pakistan, large influxes of Afghan refugees have 
dramatically affected the political and social climate. Rwandan refugees in Uganda were key players in 
Uganda’s rebellion under Yoweri Museveni’s command. After Museveni gained power, local jealousies 
of perceived favoritism towards the Rwandan refugees boiled over into more violence. It is easy to 
observe tensions sparked by Palestinian refugees, Somali refugees in Kenya, and many other situations. 
Second, ethnic conflict in one country can prompt groups in another to make more extreme demands or 
update their beliefs about the likely demands of other groups.27 Burundi and Rwanda have illustrated 
this mechanism extremely well. The 1972 genocide of Hutus in Burundi by the Tutsi army sparked pre-
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existing tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Many Hutus in Rwanda saw this as a signal 
that they would have to solve the “Tutsi question” before they suffered the same fate. Juvenal 
Habyarimana was able to calm tensions when he took power in 1973, but suspicions remained. With the 
genocide in Burundi, many Rwandans lost hope for peaceful coexistence between Hutus and Tutsis. 
Hutu Power leaders frequently referred to those events in the lead-up to Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 as 
evidence of what would happen to Hutus if they did not kill the Tutsis first.28 Third, ethnic conflict in one 
country can cause groups in other countries to lose confidence in their existing ethnic contracts. For 
instance, if events abroad suggest that wealthy minority groups may not be able to use their economic 
leverage as well as previously believed, then the poorer majority may become emboldened and the 
minority threatened. This tension can easily lead to conflict, such as when Serbia’s suppression of 
Kosovo’s aspirations to become a republic in 1981 provided a signal to other groups in Yugoslavia of the 
inefficacy of existing federal safeguards.29 Hardin argues this was the beginning of the unraveling of 
Yugoslavia.30 Finally, ethnic conflict abroad may lead groups to update their beliefs about the costs of 
protest or violence and their likelihood of success. For example, Slovenia’s relatively easy break from 
Yugoslavia, which merely precipitated a ten day war and fewer than 70 casualties, gave the impression 
that the dissolution of a country was relatively easy.31  
 Refugee flows present a negative externality from civil war, as they can facilitate the 
transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict.32 Arms proliferation has 
been shown to be extremely harmful to refugees, often leading to refugee militarization. Refugee camps 
in Guinea for example are popularly condemned for harboring large caches of Sierra Leonean, Liberian, 
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or locally sourced weaponry.33 Many refugees have no wish to get involved in further conflict, but there 
can be enough refugees that do wish to continue fighting to help conflict spread.34 
 Refugees can also serve as a source of escalation. The willingness of a state to receive refugees 
in and of itself can be regarded as a hostile act by the sending state. Sudan’s hosting of Eritrean refugees 
has at times been viewed as a hostile act by Ethiopia, generating some tension between the two 
countries.35 Rebels have sometimes mixed with refugees and used the receiving state as a staging area 
for attacks against the state they had fled. This is not always with the receiving state’s consent. As the 
sending state responds to the attacks of those rebels, their “hot pursuit” cross-border attacks may spiral 
out of control into a wider war. This happened in late 1996 when Rwanda invaded Zaire to address its 
threat from ex-FAR militants in the refugee camps. Additionally, if the refugees spark any irredentist 
sentiment, conflict can escalate quickly. This has been the case in Pakistan and India’s conflicts over 
Kashmir for example. Another mechanism conflict escalation can work through is the initiation of 
“diversionary wars” by leaders seeking to maintain support. Serbian President Milosevic’s actions during 
the collapse of Yugoslavia were strongly motivated by his desire to avoid dealing with the opposition’s 
demands for substantial economic reforms. Part of his aggressive behavior during this period involved 
supporting the militarization of Bosnian refugees during the Bosnian War.36 
 The refugees’ situation is made even more difficult by the observation that refugee flows 
increase the likelihood of conflict initiation by both sending and receiving countries. Receiving countries 
may launch military action to seal their borders, threaten sending states, or even invade sending states 
to prevent refugees from entering. Sending states may pursue refugees across the border or punish 
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receiving states for harboring them.37 From either angle, refugees cannot be assured that they will be 
safe from state aggression. Their difficult position makes them more ready to prepare for conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
 The literature has suggested several causes of refugee militarization. The best arguments so far 
have been in support of identifying the type of refugee population, level of support from the receiving 
state, pre-existing tensions within the receiving state, and level of foreign support as causes of refugee 
militarization. I also add state strength as an important factor to consider in whether a refugee 
population will militarize. Thus, my hypotheses are the following: 
 
 
H1:  State-in-exile refugee populations are the most likely groups of refugees to undergo refugee 
 militarization 
 
H2: Receiving states that support the militarization of the refugees they are hosting will host refugee 
 militarization 
 
H3: Receiving states with pre-existing tensions are more likely to host refugee militarization 
H4: Foreign support for refugee militarization causes it to occur 
H5: As state strength decreases, the likelihood of refugee militarization increases  
 
  However, there has been a lack of comparison between these factors to examine each one’s 
explanatory capability. It is not clear if any of these factors merely explain how refugee militarization has 
occurred in certain cases, rather than serve as causes of refugee militarization. Many questions need to 
be answered about these factors. In cases where a state-in-exile refugee population exists, have they 
ever not militarized? What prevented them from doing so? Foreign support can easily be demonstrated 
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to have helped refugees militarize, but would refugees in these cases have been able to militarize 
anyway? Can refugees militarize in a state that does not want them to militarize? These questions and 
more will be answered in this thesis. 
III. Methodology  
 Very few scholars have thus far addressed the topic of what causes refugee militarization, so 
there remains a lot of data to be collected and data sets to be produced. So, I will limit my analysis to 
the cases of Rwandan refugees from the social revolution and related chaos from 1959-1964, Rwandan 
refugees from the 1994 genocide, and Afghan refugees from the Soviet invasion from 1979 until its final 
withdrawal in 1989. Some historical examples will also be used to refine and explain my main themes, 
but they will not be the focus of my analysis. 
 These cases are not a representative sample of refugee flows. That is intentional. I chose these 
cases because at least one of the countries where refugees fled in each situation hosted refugees that 
militarized at least partially. My contention is that if my analysis does not indicate that certain 
hypotheses hold in these cases, then those hypotheses are even less likely to hold in a broader large N 
sample. 
 At the same time, there are several factors that I choose to vary in order to strengthen my 
conclusions. Namely, my cases include variation in time period, region, and ethnicity. The earliest case 
involves the Rwandan refugee flows from 1959-1964. Then the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan 
lasted from 1979-1989. The Rwandan genocide then took place in 1994. Regionally, I am looking at 
Rwanda and its neighbors and Afghanistan and its neighbors. As for ethnicity, the two regions I am 
looking at include very different ethnic groups. Additionally, it is important to note that there are 
substantial differences between cross-border ethnic ties in these two regions. The border between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan is incredibly porous. It is largely populated by Pashtuns on both sides of the 
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border. The tie between the Pashtun people is so strong that there remains a claim to “Pashtunistan,” 
which would include as much as the majority of Afghanistan and a large chunk of Pakistan.38 The border 
between Rwanda and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC) used to be extremely 
porous. In fact, Rwanda’s borders were still being discussed into the 1920s.39 However, by the time 
Rwanda’s social revolution broke out in 1959, there was not a significant level of debate about the 
borders between Rwanda and the DRC. The rest of Rwanda’s neighbors, as well as the rest of 
Afghanistan’s neighbors, do not have significant border disputes with those countries. Burundi has 
similar proportions of Hutus and Tutsis as Rwanda, but there is still no sense of irredentism between 
Burundi and Rwanda. By including variance in all of these factors, I am strengthening my ability to 
generalize my conclusions. 
 To address my hypotheses, I use a combination of academic literature, newspaper articles, and 
statements from various NGOs and relevant figures. Enough secondary sources exist to allow me to not 
have to rely upon primary sources for a substantial part of the analysis. I will include primary sources, 
but I do not need to rely exclusively upon them. 
 It is important to note that my hypotheses are not independent of each other. For instance, if 
the receiving state is a weak state, then it may be more likely to have serious pre-existing tensions that 
an influx of refugees could aggravate. I will address these kinds of interactions further in my analysis. 
After I identify which hypotheses possess the most explanatory power, I will be able to focus on the 
interactions that are most likely at play. 
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A. Which refugee populations militarized?  
  
 The first aspect of this analysis involves the identification of which refugee populations are 
militarized. This determination will be based on the definition of refugee militarization provided by 
Muggah and Mogire outlined earlier. Making these determinations clear now will provide context for 
why I am focusing on specific receiving states and it will provide a useful baseline for the rest of the 
analysis.   
Rwandan refugee population 1959-1964 
 Thousands of refugees resulted from the Rwandan revolution from 1959-1962 and the violent 
reactions in 1963 and 1964 to armed Tutsi attempts to regain power. There was a lull in the refugee 
flows in 1962, when Rwanda officially gained its independence, but essentially the period 1959-1964 
involved one connected flow of refugees from Rwanda.40 Official UNHCR numbers indicate that by late 
1964 200,000 refugees had gone to Burundi, 78,000 had fled to Uganda, 36,000 had left for Tanzania, 
and 22,000 had gone to Zaire. Refugees would argue that this is a low estimate because it does not take 
into account self-settled refugees who lived outside the refugee camps. They estimate that the total 
refugee population was about 500,000. Gerard Prunier disagrees with that estimate though because it 
includes people in Zaire or Uganda who were previous migrants and not refugees. He does not fully 
disagree with the refugees’ claims. Instead, Prunier allows for the possibility that there were around 
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400,000 refugees.41 Either way, the important point to take away is that there were hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandan refugees. 
 Of these four countries, my analysis will focus on the Rwandan refugees who fled into Burundi 
and Uganda. Tanzania and Zaire received relatively low amounts of refugees, and the potential causes of 
refugee militarization that the literature has suggested were the least prevalent in those countries. 
Some Rwandan refugees did not integrate very well into Zaire, so there were some Tutsi refugees from 
this group who chose to join the RPF later on when it invaded Rwanda.42 However, that number is quite 
small, and is not important for the purposes of this thesis. 
Rwandan refugees from the 1994 Genocide 
 The Rwandan genocide is argued to have created over two million refugees. According to 
UNHCR numbers, Burundi’s refugee population increased by just below 30,000 from 1993 to 1994. 
Uganda’s refugee population remained the same between 1993 and 1994. Tanzania’s refugee 
population increased by over 250,000 between 1993 and 1994. Zaire’s refugee population increased by 
approximately 1.2 million from 1993 to 1994.43 The map below illustrates where the largest refugee 
camps were located.44 With these numbers in mind, refugees that may have gone to Uganda or Burundi 
were inconsequential with regards to concerns over militarization (see map below for more 
information). Therefore, the analysis of refugees from this event will focus on Zaire (Democratic 
Republic of Congo) and Tanzania. 
 
                                                          
41
 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 63. 
42
 Ibid. 
43 World Bank, "The World Bank," World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, September 28, 
2010, http://data.worldbank.org/country (accessed October 24, 2010). 
44







Soviet Union invades Afghanistan 1979-1990 
 The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan that began in 1979 created millions of refugees. 
These refugees almost exclusively went to Pakistan and Iran. Iran’s refugee population steadily rose 
from 130,100 in 1979 to 4,174,401 in 1990. Pakistan’s refugee population was 400,000 in 1979, and it 
rose to as high as 3,275,715 in 1989. In 1990, its refugee population fell slightly to 3,255,975. These 
flows are illustrated in the map below.45 Tajikistan has been such a small player in hosting refugees that 
UNHCR does not even have a count of refugees in Tajikistan until 1992. UNHCR does not have a count of 
refugees in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan until 1993.46 Considering how Soviet forces were coming from 
these countries, this movement pattern is very understandable. Since Afghan refugees generally fled to 
Pakistan or Iran, unless they were wealthy enough to leave the region entirely, my analysis will center 
on how these two countries received refugees. 
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In which countries did militarization happen? 
 Using the definition of refugee militarization from Muggah and Mogire, I will now apply it to my 
cases. The first case is the Rwandan refugees created by Rwanda’s revolution and related violence from 
1959-1964. As discussed earlier, I am focusing on the Rwandan refugees hosted by Burundi and Uganda 
in this period. These refugees present a different situation than the other two cases. This is because 
there was one group, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), which attempted to militarize Rwandan 
refugees throughout the Great Lakes region. Prospective instigators of refugee militarization in the 
other two cases did not have a regional focus, so the refugee population in each country in those two 
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cases can be analyzed separately. Here, the Rwandan refugees must be viewed, to an extent, as a 
regional group. 
 There were armed attacks conducted by Tutsi militants going into Rwanda from about 1960-
1966. Those carrying out the attacks were often referred to as inyenzi. Rene Lemarchand defines the 
inyenzi as follows: 
 Meaning, literally, ‘cockroaches,’ the term inyenzi is currently used both within and outside 
 Rwanda to refer to small-scale, Tutsi-led guerilla units trained and organized outside Rwanda 
 and varying in size from about six to twelve men.47 
The inyenzi attacked primarily from Burundi and Uganda. They had aspirations to seize control of the 
Rwandan government and to return power to Tutsis. However, as Lemarchand describes, they displayed 
a combination of “political ineptitude, tactical blundering, and gratuitous cruelty” that prevented them 
from ever really gaining popular support or enough power to pose a significant threat to Rwanda. The 
Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), the organization leading the inyenzi, never became a “tightly-knit, 
well-organized party.”48 
 There were disagreements over numerous policies within UNAR. These disagreements went 
beyond the usual conservative and progressive political divide that normally existed among Tutsis. For 
example, some elements in UNAR felt that a revolution should happen from within Rwanda to restore 
Tutsis to power, while others felt that the Hutu-led government should be forcefully overthrown from 
the outside. Jovite Nzamwita, one of the inyenzi movement’s leaders, wrote to his colleague Abbe 
Ruterandongezi about the moderate Tutsi leader Michel Rwagasana’s choice to pursue reconciliation 
with Hutu President Gregoire Kayibanda’s government in Rwanda. Nzamwita insisted on the absolute 
necessity ‘to stay outside Rwanda to avoid falling into the hands of the Belgian paracommandos and 
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their Kayibanda.’ In numerous documents, it is clear that many of the Tutsi exiles felt utter disdain for 
Tutsis who had remained in Rwanda and had decided to work with the government. Lemarchand argues 
that some of the Tutsi exiles may have showed indifference for the fate of the remaining Tutsis in 
Rwanda. These exiles did not seem to worry about the danger that would be placed upon innocent 
Tutsis by their attacks.49 Another major disagreement was over how to use party funds. In early 1963, 
Francois Rukeba, Minister of Defense at the time in UNAR’s “government-in-exile,” accused Michel 
Kayihura and Jean Bosco Kayunga, respectively Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, of squandering 
$100,000. This amount equaled the amount given by the Catholic Relief Fund, the Oxford Committee for 
Famine Relief and various Communist and nationalist countries. This dispute came at a time when UNAR 
needed unity, not disunity.50 On top of these issues was the fact that it was extremely difficult for the 
leadership of UNAR to communicate across countries. The lack of communication made coordinated 
action extremely difficult.51 
 There were several attacks launched by UNAR forces into Rwanda, but they were never very 
successful. The major attacks were conducted in March 1961, two in July 1962, two in December 1963, 
June-July 1964, March-April 1964, two in November 1966, and July 1966.52 As the map below shows, 
refugees in Burundi carried out the most attacks.53 
                                                          
49
 Ibid, 201. 
50
 Ibid, 206. 
51
 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 199. 
52
 Ibid, 218. 
53




 Uganda did not support the UNAR and its ambitions. In Uganda, overall administrative efficiency 
of the Ugandan government, the Ugandan government’s attitude toward the UNAR, and the 
geographical remoteness of Buganda from the border areas were all important factors in allowing 
Uganda to strictly control the refugee leadership. Furthermore, the Banyarwanda (Rwandan) immigrants 
in Uganda displayed a very cautious, if not overtly hostile, attitude toward the refugees. They generally 
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did not support UNAR leadership, and they were not willing to sacrifice more prestigious and lucrative 
positions within the Ugandan government to support the UNAR’s cause.54 The Ugandan government 
made several statements and took action to back up these points. In early 1962, the Special Branch of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs undertook an investigation that led to the expulsion of twenty-four 
refugees suspected of organizing inyenzi commandos. In May 1962, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
released a statement saying: 
 Firm discipline is absolutely necessary if these refugees are to be made to behave in a manner 
 which does not prejudice relations between Uganda and her neighbours. It is important that the 
 Uganda government should begin to look outside her own boundaries and not take decisions 
 based only on possible political repercussions within Uganda itself… and it is important for the 
 future of this country that she should do everything possible to maintain good relations with her 
 neighbours, even though, by so doing, the government may alienate certain sections of the 
 community within Uganda.55 
On July 5, 1963, news broke of a raid that had been launched against Rwanda. Prime Minister Milton 
Obote warned against the militarization of refugees in Uganda:  
 “I wish to make it clear that I will not tolerate this sort of activity… We have no intention within 
 the context of the Addis Ababa spirit and Charter of allowing Uganda to be used as a base for 
 any attacks or subversion against any African state… If *our+ hospitality is abused, and refugees 
 use or attempt to use Uganda as a base to attack our neighbours, we shall have no alternative 
 but to withdraw the protection we have granted to these people.”56 
  
 Burundi is a more complicated case. With frequent changes in government, the Burundian 
policy of hosting Rwandan refugees was frequently changing. There was also an ethnic bond between 
the Tutsi elites in Burundi and the Tutsi exiles from Rwanda. Furthermore, Burundi’s lack of 
administrative efficiency and co-ordination at the local and provincial levels meant that there was a lack 
of control over the refugees. China’s recognition of Burundi in 1963 added to the diplomatic tools at 
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UNAR’s disposal.57 Until the major raid that occurred in December 1963, the refugees in Burundi did not 
get much of a chance to invade Rwanda. In fact, a raid involving 1500 refugees was attempted in 
November 1963 that the Burundi authorities prevented. By the time of the next invasion attempt 
though, the Burundian government’s relationship with the Rwandese government was deteriorating. 
Negotiations in Gisenyi, Rwanda had been unsuccessful at reaching an agreement for the sharing of 
reserve currencies. In response, Burundi Vice-Prime Minister Dr. Pie Masumbuko commented, “Rwanda 
is ungrateful.  Recently we have arrested people who were about to attack you and now you decide to 
sever economic relations with us. Therefore you do not want collaboration.”58 
 After the attacks, Hutus in Rwanda often responded with massacres of Tutsis. For example, after 
the attack from Burundi in December 1963, the Hutu response involved the killing of approximately 
between 10,000 and 14,000 Tutsis. These killings were brutal and terrifying. Many Tutsis, including 
leadership of UNAR, had enough evidence to at least understand that this was likely to happen. They 
knew that there was a good chance of violent reprisal against Tutsis within Rwanda. When the backlash 
did indeed occur, UNAR was unable to effectively protest. The United States and Europe did not learn 
about the massacres, and Burundi was the only country in the region to protest publicly. The raid in 
December 1963 had been UNAR’s major push to retake power in Rwanda. With its failure, and the lack 
of international protest for the Hutu response, the UNAR had run out of political capital. Its leadership 
was too divided and ineffective, and it lacked the legitimacy to win substantial support from refugees 
and external parties. By the end of 1994, UNAR had whittled away to the point where it practically 
ceased to exist.  
 UNAR had been able to provide a source of political organization for Tutsi exiles, but it never 
produced a significant military force. This is why even the UNAR was unable to turn any of the Rwandan 
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refugee populations into a state-in-exile group. UNAR also tried to win over foreign support, but at best 
it was only able to get some weapons shipments and training from the Chinese government.59 
 Going back to the definition of refugee militarization from Muggah and Mogire, the 
determination can now be made of whether the refugee populations in Uganda and Burundi were 
militarized. For the first characteristic, militarized activity in and outside the camps, Burundi had a little 
bit and Uganda had almost none. Attacks were launched from both countries, but the attacks were very 
weak. Many of the attackers did not even have guns. The Ugandan government was also adamant about 
preventing militarization as much as possible. The Burundian government stopped some attacks, but 
later may have gone so far as to assist some attacks. The second characteristic, political activism and 
violence, was present with UNAR, but Ugandan refugees largely did not support UNAR and UNAR’s 
organization was too disorganized to take advantage of a potential opportunity in Burundi. The third 
characteristic, military training and recruitment, was largely non-existent in Uganda. However, with 
China’s help, some military training and recruitment was able to take place in Burundi. Again, it did not 
occur on a large scale, but some military training and recruitment certainly happened. The last 
characteristic is support for armed combatants and armed resistance among the refugees. This was 
certainly not present in Uganda. In Burundi, there was not an overwhelming amount of support from 
the refugees, but some did exist. All in all, this means that the Rwandan refugee population in Uganda 
did not have any characteristics of a militarized refugee population and Burundi had a little bit of each 
characteristic. Therefore, the refugees in Uganda were clearly not militarized. Burundi’s refugees were 
somewhat militarized. This refugee population did not possess enough of any of the characteristics of 
militarized refugees to be definitively labeled as such, but it was at least partially militarized. 
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 Looking more long term, the refugees in Uganda did not just meld into Ugandan society. They 
mostly remained separated from the rest of Ugandan society. Beginning in the 1970s, some members of 
this refugee population did become active with Ugandan militants. Fred Rwigyema, one of the founding 
members of the RPF along with Paul Kagame, began his involvement by fighting alongside Yoweri 
Museveni in the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), which invaded Uganda from Tanzania with 
Tanzanian backing to remove Idi Amin from power.60 Rwigyema and Kagame were later both involved in 
the first battle of the National Resistance Army (NRA). The military and leadership skills they developed, 
as well as the numerous other Banyarwanda refugees who became officers and obtained substantial 
military experience, allowed them to build the capacity for the refugees to have strong military 
organization. The troop strength of the RPF was only about 5,000 when it invaded Rwanda in 1990, but 
those troops had extensive military experience and a solid alliance with Yoweri Museveni.61 At that 
point, Rwandan refugees in Uganda possessed all the characteristics of refugee militarization. The 
invasion was militarized activity outside of the camps. The RPF was very politically active. Kagame and 
Rwigyema had each been in contact with foreign powers, as well as organizing their own people. 
Military training and recruitment had primarily occurred when RPF members were fighting with the NRA 
during its insurgency from 1981-1986. Lastly, events in Uganda and fears of returning to Rwanda had 
convinced Rwandan refugees that the only way to return to Rwanda would be by force. 
 The second case is the Rwandan refugees who fled in 1994 due to the genocide. As I 
demonstrated earlier, Tanzania and Zaire are the two countries to scrutinize for refugee militarization.  
 After all the genocide’s atrocities, much of the political and military leadership of the Hutu 
génocidaires was able to escape Rwanda. They mixed with the refugees who mostly fled to Tanzania and 
Zaire. Refugee camps in Zaire held at least 850,000 people, including 30,000 to 40,000 ex-Rwandan 
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Armed Forces (FAR) soldiers. Fiona Terry estimates that between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans 
crossed the Zairian border between July 14, 1994 and July 17, 1994.62 Practically all the politicians and 
military men went to Zaire, where President Mobutu Sese Seko’s sympathy allowed them greater 
freedom of movement.63 
 Scholars have developed a consensus that the Rwandan refugees in Zaire during this period 
were militarized. Their findings show that all of Muggah and Mogire’s characteristics of refugee 
militarization were present in Zaire. Fiona Terry has direct knowledge from her position with MSF of 
militant activity within the camps, and there is extensive documentation of the militants’ armed attacks 
into Rwanda.64 The political activism and violence is well documented by Sarah Lischer.65 The same 
authors also show that military training and recruitment was occurring, with support from thousands of 
people. Refugee militarization clearly took place in Zaire.      
 The refugees who went to Tanzania had a very different fate than those that went to Zaire. With 
the political and military leadership primarily in Zaire, the attempts that were made to militarize the 
refugees in Tanzania failed. There was also no serious political activism, which meant that nobody really 
tried to obtain support from the refugees for armed resistance. Furthermore, there was no military 
training or recruitment either. This group of refugees was definitely not militarized. 
 The third and final case is the Afghan refugees from the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979. These 
refugees went to Pakistan and Iran, so my analysis will look at these two countries. 
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 The Afghan refugees in Iran did not militarize. For the most part, they were able to mix in with 
Iranian society, satisfying Iran’s demand for cheap labor at the time. They did not engage in political 
activism or attempt to organize militarily. With increasing oil wealth and industrialization, Iran had 
plenty of demand for cheap labor. In fact, thousands of Afghans had already crossed into Iran as migrant 
workers before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.66 With such an ability to integrate 
refugees into its society, Iran was able to prevent Afghan refugees from turning to militarization. As Paul 
Collier would argue, the opportunity costs for Afghan refugees in Iran were just too high to take up arms 
and participate in further conflict.67 
 Pakistan was an entirely different matter. Afghan refugees in Pakistan participated in a lot of 
militarized activity in and outside the refugee camps. The covert war largely financed by the CIA, Saudi 
intelligence, and ISI included the Afghan refugees as its foot soldiers. Thousands of refugees volunteered 
from the camps to participate in the fighting.68 While at first the refugees did not have effective political 
organization, Pakistani support and guidance led to seven parties being recognized by 1981. These 
parties became increasingly active as they received more funds and guidance. Moreover, Pakistan’s 
government helped the refugees make their case for support on the international stage. The resistance 
movement was then able to recruit without hassle, thanks to Pakistan’s accommodation in allowing it to 
have unrestricted access to the refugee camps for recruitment.69 Finally, the refugees demonstrated 
their support for armed resistance in numerous ways. One of the most poignant examples of this was in 
the education system for refugees. Refugee education included chants of anti-Russian slogans and 
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weapons training for children as young as nine.70 With all these factors in place, the Afghan refugee 
population in Pakistan was clearly militarized. 
 To summarize, the refugee populations in Pakistan during the Soviet Union’s invasion, Zaire 
immediately following the Rwandan genocide, and Uganda in 1990 were all clear, unambiguous 
examples of refugee militarization. The refugee population in Uganda in 1990 derived from Rwanda’s 
turmoil from 1959-1964. In the short term, Uganda’s Rwandan refugee population was not militarized 
from 1959-1964. However, after Rwanda’s revolution from 1959-1962, violent reprisals to the inyenzi 
attacks in the early to mid 1960s, Rwandan turmoil in 1973, and involvement in Uganda’s power 
struggles, Rwandan refugees in Uganda formed the RPF in 1987 and eventually invaded Rwanda in 1990. 
Rwandan refugees in Burundi from 1959-1964 had a little bit of a few factors of refugee militarization, 
but the complete ineffectiveness of attempted armed attacks and abysmal organization show that they 
are better explained as not being an example of refugee militarization. The last two situations I am 
analyzing, Tanzania in 1994 and Iran during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were clearly not 
examples of refugee militarization. 
Table 1: Militarization Status 
Receiving State Militarization Status 
Burundi 1959-1964 Somewhat militarized 
Uganda 1959-1964 Not Militarized 
Uganda 1990 Militarized 
Zaire 1994 Militarized 
Tanzania 1994 Not militarized 
Pakistan 1980s Militarized 
Iran 1980s Not militarized 
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B. Type of Refugee Population 
 
 Analyzing the type of refugee population that existed in each country essentially means 
determining the preferences and capabilities of the refugee population. This approach is inherently at 
odds with the common global image of refugees through much of the 20th century. During that time, 
refugees were perceived as being weak and powerless. If they were participating in a conflict, then it 
must have been due to external influence and manipulation. More recently, the international 
community has come to recognize refugees as actors in conflict. These actors can and do become active 
participants in some conflicts.71 Therefore, analyzing the type of refugee population that exists in each 
situation should yield some indication of when refugee militarization will occur and the refugees will 
become active participants in conflict. 
Uganda 1959-1964 
 The first step in determining the type of refugee population that Uganda was hosting from 1959-
1964 involves identifying what the refugees were fleeing. In this case, the refugees were fleeing turmoil 
in Rwanda relating to the 1959 revolution and subsequent violence that occurred as a result of the 
revolution. Violence was targeted against Tutsis in Rwanda. For the revolution, violence toward Tutsis 
happened as a result of Hutu frustration about being excluded from power for so long and finally having 
Belgian support to take control of their country. Mamdani characterizes the 1959-1964 period as a time 
of fluctuation between the accommodationist and exclusionist tendencies of the Hutu elite 
(PARMEHUTU) and the Tutsi elite (UNAR). Accomodationists were those who were willing to negotiate 
and work with those in the other ethnic group. Exclusionists were not willing to negotiate and often 
favored the use of harsh measures, sometimes violence, with the other ethnic group. As Mamdani 
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explains it, 1959 was an exclusionist time. Rwandans on both sides then became more 
accommodationist until gaining independence with the New York Accord in 1962. The New York Accord 
successfully convinced some members of UNAR to return to Kigali and participate in a coalition 
government. The accommodationist tendencies lasted until UNAR launched major armed raids in 1963. 
These raids culminated in the Bugesera invasion in December of 1963. Militants nearly got within 20 
miles of Kigali, but were eventually put down.72 Hutu leaders in Rwanda quickly responded by directing 
the massacre of thousands of Tutsis, primarily in the prefecture of Gikongoro. In particular, the local 
prefect for Gikongoro, Andre Nkeramugabe, is reported to have told a meeting of burgomasters and 
PARMEHUTU propagandists: “We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about [it] is to 
paralyze the Tutsi. How? They must be killed.”73 Estimates of the number of Tutsis killed have ranged 
over time and between sources from 750 to 20,000.74 Catharine and David Newbury estimate that 
between 10,000 and 14,000 Tutsis were killed, and Rene Lemarchand agrees with that assessment.75 
The 1959 revolution involved the deaths of only about 200 Tutsis.76 This dynamic provides a good 
explanation for why such a large proportion of the refugees who fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1964 
fled Rwanda during 1963 and 1964. 
 Throughout the 1959-1964 period it is clear that the violence occurring in Rwanda was targeting 
Tutsis. There were not any serious armed Tutsi attacks until 1963. While the revolution of 1959 only 
involved about 200 deaths, those who left at that time were still fleeing targeted violence. There was 
not a full-scale civil war, so with Lischer’s line of reasoning, Rwandan refugees were most likely to fit into 
the category of persecuted refugees. 
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 To test this assumption, I need to determine if the Rwandan refugees had effective political and 
military organization. This is a characteristic that I discussed earlier, when I was evaluating whether 
Rwandan refugees in Uganda were militarized. As I explained then, the UNAR attempted to provide 
political and military leadership for Rwandan refugees in Uganda, but it was ineffective and ultimately 
rejected by the refugees it sought to lead. Therefore, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda can be classified 
as persecuted refugees. 
 Even though persecuted refugees can become militarized, they usually do not. This instance 
illustrates an example of a persecuted refugee population that did not militarize. For the most part, 
these refugees lacked the capacity and the desire to invade Rwanda. The attempted political and 
military leadership from UNAR was unsuccessful as well. 
Uganda 1990 
 The Rwandan refugee population in Uganda in 1990 still derived primarily from the 1959-1964 
chaos. There was an additional flow of refugees to Uganda around 1973 because of the tension and 
eventual coup d’etat that brought Juvenal Habyarimana to power in Rwanda. In 1973, refugees fled 
because of fears about targeted violence against them. So, the refugees in Uganda were bound to either 
be classified as persecuted or state-in-exile refugees. 
 That distinction can then be made by looking for the presence of political and military 
organization. For the Rwandan refugees in Uganda from 1959-1964, UNAR tried and failed to provide 
these things. In 1990 though, Rwandan refugees were organizing behind the RPF. The RPF had been 
formed in 1987, after Yoweri Museveni had come to power and realized how much of a political liability 
his Rwandan allies were. The RPF leadership involved Fred Rwigema and Paul Kagame at the top, and 
numerous others who had received military experience with the NRA during their insurgency and civil 
war from 1981-1986. While the troop strength of the RPF was no more than 4,000-5,000 in 1990, their 
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soldiers and commanders were battle-hardened and well-organized. Politically, they had the backing of 
the refugee population at large, and so were able to provide effective political organization. They 
maintained strong ties with Yoweri Museveni even as he had to publicly distance himself from them in 
order to maintain political support among Ugandans.77  
 Part of the evidence of the effectiveness of the RPF’s political and military organization was that 
it was able to respond to overtures being made by Rwanda about the potential for peaceful repatriation. 
In July 1990, some members of the Rwandan government who were aware of RPF mobilization in 
Uganda came to an agreement to send Rwandese government delegates to visit Uganda and select lists 
of candidates for a repatriation exercise due to be carried out in November. This decision threatened 
RPF militants who wanted to forcefully seize power in Rwanda because it threatened to lure Rwandan 
refugees away from the movement with the promise of a peaceful return. RPF militants also received a 
boost to their agenda from MRND radicals who wanted to finish off their opponents once and for all.78 
Here, there was a convergence of preferred outcomes among the radicals within MRND and the radicals 
within the RPF. Radicals wanted to fight, while moderates were much more likely to support peaceful 
solutions. Negotiating repatriation was therefore very appealing to moderates, but a great threat to 
radicals on both sides. Later, on September 28, 1990, three days before the RPF invasion began, Rwanda 
President Habyarimana addressed the UN General Assembly in New York and announced two significant 
concessions to refugees. First, Rwanda would grant travel documents and citizenship to anyone who did 
not desire naturalization in their country of asylum. Second, Rwanda would repatriate many of those 
who wanted to return. This announcement was surely recognition of the RPF’s power and its threat to 
the Rwandan state.79 However, it was too late by that point to stop a process that had been developing 
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for years. Circumstances in Uganda were pushing the refugees out, and the RPF had convinced the 
refugees that an armed return was the only way they could return to Rwanda.      
 With these qualities, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda in 1990 definitely had the makings of a 
state-in-exile refugee population. As would be expected from this classification of refugees, they did 
undergo the process of refugee militarization.   
Burundi 1959-1964 
 The refugees in Burundi were very similar to the refugees in Uganda. They fled the same 
targeted violence and lacked effective political and military organization. As with the refugees in 
Uganda, UNAR was the party attempting to mobilize the refugees. While UNAR did have more success in 
Burundi than Uganda, it still did not have nearly enough success mobilizing refugees to be considered to 
have provided effective political and military organization. Therefore, like Uganda, Burundi’s refugee 
population can be classified as persecuted refugees. 
Tanzania 1994 
 Rwandan refugees who fled into Tanzania were fleeing essentially the same situation as the 
refugees who fled to Zaire. They were running away from RPF forces. The only difference is that the 
refugees fleeing to Tanzania were fleeing as the RPF was in the early stages of its advance through 
Rwanda. Hutu Power still had control in Kigali, so it was not yet certain which side would win control of 
Rwanda. The RPF surely appeared more powerful, but the real test for the RPF was set to be the battle 
for Kigali. The refugees fleeing to Zaire largely fled after the RPF had taken Kigali and had decided to 
take over the rest of the country. Their flight primarily came after the RPF defeated ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe forces at Gisenyi, the last stronghold for Hutu Power elements. As I have previously 
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established, this situation means that the refugee populations fleeing to both Zaire and Tanzania were 
going to be persecuted refugee populations or state-in-exile refugee populations. 
 Because the refugees going to Tanzania went before the outcome of the conflict in Rwanda was 
decided, the Hutu Power leadership and organizers of the genocide largely did not flee with them. They 
went to Zaire instead when they realized that they had lost. This meant that the political and military 
leadership of the genocidaires did not go to Tanzania. The Rwandan refugee population in Tanzania did 
not have an effective political and military leadership with them, so there was no serious attempt at 
refugee militarization. It was a persecuted refugee population.   
Zaire 1994 
 The Rwandan Hutu refugee population in Zaire is a prime example of a state-in-exile group. 
Refugee camps were controlled by the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe.80 This control was discussed by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report to the Security Council on January 25, 1995: 
 "... the refugee population in Zaire tends to include more political, military and militia elements 
 of the former Government than the camps in the United Republic of Tanzania or Burundi and 
 their hostility towards the Government in Kigali is reflected in actions that have led to insecure 
 conditions in the camps. 
 
 More specifically, the refugees are intimidated from publicly expressing their desire to return to 
 Rwanda. The lives of such people, as well as the lives of politically moderate refugees or those 
 who may have intermarried or are suspected of being infiltrators are seriously threatened and 
 some of them are known to have been killed. There is also a significant threat of civil 
 disturbances in the camps. This threat is especially acute when refugees congregate together, 
 for example, when relief supplies are distributed. In addition, as in any area containing a large 
 number of people living in highly dense and impoverished conditions, common crime is 
 prevalent in the camps. 
 
 Initially, the leaders in the camps were called upon to facilitate the delivery of relief assistance. 
 Unfortunately they misused this responsibility by using the delivery of assistance to persuade 
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 refugees to behave according to their interests and by hoarding and/or selling such assistance 
 rather than distributing it."81 
 
 Within the first few months in exile, the ex-FAR and National Gendarmerie fused under a single 
authority called the Rwandan Armed Forces Command. Initially, the authority was placed under the 
Minister of Defense, Colonel Athanase Gasake. There were originally four commissions: Social Affairs, 
Information and Documentation, Planning and Operations, and Capital and Finance. In September 1994 
a fifth commission was created. It was for Politics and External Relations. The armed forces had two 
divisions. Camp documents state that the first contained 7,680 soldiers. The second contained 10,240 
men. In addition, there were separate support units numbering about 4,000 soldiers, making a total of 
about 22,000 soldiers. Other estimates generally range between 30,000 and 50,000 ex-FAR soldiers in 
the refugee camps, so there is clearly a substantial margin of error in any of these numbers. Estimates of 
the number of militia members are even more varied, ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 militia soldiers.82 
Camp documents limit their mention of the militia to complaints about the militia’s lack of discipline. 
They also discuss the decision to forbid the presence of militia in the camps unless militia members had 
undergone proper military training.83  
 The Rwandan Armed Forces were able to pay for all this militarization with many sources. For 
starters, the ex-FAR and Hutu government of Rwanda had emptied Rwanda’s banks on their way out of 
the country. Gerard Prunier estimates that $30-40 million of local currency and $30-40 million dollars of 
foreign currency were taken into Zaire. Furthermore, hundreds of vehicles, trucks, buses, and machinery 
worth millions of dollars were brought into Zaire. Many of these items were sold off for individual profit, 
but a lot of them were used by the militants. Perhaps most importantly, the ex-FAR successfully brought 
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considerable quantities of military hardware into Zaire with them.84 Human Rights Watch Arms Project 
has reported that the military hardware was kept in bases near Goma that were maintained by ex-FAR 
soldiers.85 Camp documents report that an inventory was conducted finding that the Zairian army 
possessed 6 helicopters, over 1000 artillery pieces, 35,000 light weapons, and several armed vehicles of 
Rwandan origin.86 Not all of this hardware was actually useful, but further shipments of arms 
augmented these supplies pretty well. This leadership was very skilled at diverting humanitarian 
assistance. There was a lot of assistance to divert because international donors spent $1.3 billion from 
1994 to 1996 on the Rwandan Hutu refugee population.87 The resources which the ex-FAR was able to 
access thanks to the refugees were its most important assets. Its well-developed propaganda system 
was crucial in acquiring those resources. The propaganda portrayed the Hutus as victims of the power-
hungry Tutsi-led RPF. In documents seized at refugee camps in Zaire, one propaganda document 
declared: 
 All Hutu people, whether in the interior or in exile, are demonized. They are held globally 
 responsible for the misfortune which they did not cause or provoke in the least. “The genocide” 
 has become a commercial fund for the RPF which uses it as a pretext for refusing dialogue 
 between Rwandans aimed at definitively resolving the ethnic conflict which has ravaged Rwanda 
 since October 1, 1990.88 
  One of the clearest demonstrations of the success of this propaganda comes when noting where 
the United States directed foreign assistance. The new Rwandan government, which had to scramble for 
financing due to the looting of the banks and removal of assets by the ex-FAR and Hutu refugees, had to 
struggle to receive foreign assistance. The United States stalled World Bank funds for the new RPF-led 
Rwandan government by insisting on the repayment of $10 million in arrears in order to unblock the 
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$250 million allocation. When the United States chose to allocate funds of its own to Rwanda, it 
contributed far less to Rwanda than to the refugees. For fiscal year 1994, it allocated $231.9 million in 
humanitarian assistance to the refugees and only $73.3 million for Rwanda. In fiscal year 1995, the 
refugees received $242.4 million and Rwanda received $46.2 million. Finally, the refugees received 
$177.9 million and Rwanda received $13.2 million in fiscal year 1996.89 
Pakistan during the Soviet invasion 
 When Sarah Lischer classifies the Afghan refugee population, she does not classify it as a state-
in-exile population when it first left Afghanistan. Instead, she argues that dynamics in Pakistan turned 
the Afghan refugee population there into a state-in-exile refugee population, whereas there was no 
such change in Iran. This is because when the Afghan refugees arrived in Pakistan, they were able to 
capitalize on their shared anti-communism and adherence to Islam with Pakistanis. Afghan refugees in 
Iran were not successful in this regard. Instead, according to Lischer, they maintained their status as a 
persecuted refugee group.90 
 The best way to describe Afghan refugees in Pakistan is to break them down into five groups. 
The first group included those few who came from prominent and wealthy families who had personal 
and business assets outside Afghanistan. Many members of this group quickly moved on to the United 
States or Western Europe, far away from the region’s turmoil. Then there were some refugees who 
arrived in Pakistan with all the assets they could bring with them. This group did relatively well in 
Pakistan, integrating and becoming economically active. After that were the well-educated Afghans. This 
group included doctors, teachers, and engineers, among others. They were a stabilizing influence in the 
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refugee camps. The fourth group included Afghans who escaped Afghanistan with household goods and 
livestock. Unfortunately though, they often had to rely upon the generosity of others to support 
themselves. Finally, the largest group, consisting of about 60% of the refugees, was ordinary Afghans 
who had brought nothing with them. They were largely dependent upon Pakistani and international 
assistance for subsistence.91 
 Afghan refugees in Iran were pretty similar to the refugees that went to Pakistan. Later on, 
under the Taliban, the biggest difference was that Hazara Shi’a Afghans mostly went to Iran instead of 
Pakistan. This is not to say that there was anything near a strict division of Sunni Afghans going to 
Pakistan and Shi’a Afghans going to Iran, but there was a higher percentage of Shi’a Afghans that went 
to Iran. The basic justification for this difference is that Iran is a predominantly Shia country, whereas 
Pakistan has more Sunnis. As Hazaras fled persecution from the Taliban, that religious bond was 
valuable to many people.92 In any of the refugee flows from Afghanistan, the most important distinction 
to keep in mind is that Afghans, specifically Pashtuns, going from Afghanistan to Pakistan are making a 
journey that has been made frequently by Pashtuns for centuries. There is still a strong irredentist claim 
to “Pashtunistan,” which includes a large portion of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan.93 This historic flow 
across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan makes it easier in a sense for Afghans to adjust to 
going to Pakistan than Iran. Pakistan is used to seeing large population flows back and forth across its 
border, so it would naturally have a different response to Afghan refugees than Iran. 
Iran during the Soviet invasion 
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 When Sarah Lischer classifies the Afghan refugee population, she does not classify it as a state-
in-exile population when it first left Afghanistan. Instead, she argues that dynamics in Pakistan turned 
the Afghan refugee population there into a state-in-exile refugee population, whereas there was no 
such change in Iran. This is because when the Afghan refugees arrived in Pakistan, they were able to 
capitalize on their shared anti-communism and adherence to Islam with Pakistanis. Afghan refugees in 
Iran were not successful in this regard. Instead, according to Lischer, they maintained their status as a 
persecuted refugee group.94 However, Afghan refugees in Iran did have a better living situation than the 
refugees in Pakistan. This is because unlike Pakistan, Iran had job opportunities for Afghans. With 
increasing oil wealth and industrialization, Iran had plenty of demand for cheap labor. As the graph 
below shows, Iran experienced a solid trend of growth in GDP per capita from 1970-1986.95 In fact, 
thousands of Afghans had already crossed into Iran as migrant workers before the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979.96 Iran’s economy did decline after 1986, coinciding with the less welcoming 
attitude of Iranians toward Afghan refugees in the late 1980s.97 With such an ability to integrate 
refugees into its society, Iran was able to prevent Afghan refugees from turning to militarization. As Paul 
Collier would argue, the opportunity costs for Afghan refugees in Iran were just too high to take up arms 
and participate in further conflict.98 
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 These cases do provide support for the hypothesis that the type of refugee population can 
determine whether refugee militarization will occur. However, the cases of Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
and Iran show that some refinement is needed in the theorizing on the types of refugee populations and 
how likely they are to militarize. 
 Sarah Lischer, one of the most prominent scholars exploring different types of refugee 
populations, argues that refugees must possess political and military organization in order for refugee 
militarization to occur. This argument leads her to argue that state-in-exile refugees are the most likely 
to militarize. Cases like Rwandan refugees in Zaire immediately following the genocide illustrate the 
argument quite well. The Khmer Rouge-controlled Cambodian refugee population in Thailand is a similar 
case to Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The Cambodian refugees were also fleeing a situation where millions 
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population. The Khmer Rouge, like the ex-FAR, was able to mobilize the international community to 
provide large amounts of humanitarian assistance. That assistance was then all too often used to 
contribute to refugee militarization. The comparison between the Cambodian refugees in Thailand and 
Rwandan refugees in Zaire was quickly made. Alain Destexhe contributed an article to the International 
Herald Tribune on August 11, 1994, called “Hurry to Prevent a Cambodian Epilogue in Rwanda” that was 
emblematic of the comparisons being made between Cambodia and Rwanda.99  
 On the other hand, Lischer’s argument does not adequately account for how persecuted 
refugees can militarize. Within her work, it is hard to learn how observers could distinguish which 
persecuted refugees are more likely to militarize. This is why I contend that a better way to 
conceptualize these matters is to highlight that refugee populations do need to have political and 
military organization to militarize. The political and military organization does not have to be present 
within the refugee population from the start though. A few Rwandan refugees in Uganda attempted to 
develop political and military organization during the 1959-1964 period, but they were unsuccessful. It 
took involvement in Uganda’s civil war from 1981-1986 for the refugees to develop the capability to 
create effective political and military leadership. It was thanks to their involvement in that conflict, and 
Museveni’s quiet support of their ambitions to return to Rwanda, that Rwandan refugees were able to 
develop effective enough political and military organization for refugee militarization to occur. For 
Afghan refugees, the groups that went to Iran and Pakistan both lacked political and military 
organization. Iran attempted to integrate the refugees into its society. Pakistan actively campaigned on 
their behalf to the international community, and was closely involved in developing military organization 
for the refugees. Essentially, Pakistan did political work for the Afghan refugees and was instrumental in 
helping to create military organizations for the refugees. 
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 With these points in mind, refugees sometimes have the assets they need to militarize and 
organize themselves on their own. However, there are many other times when refugees militarize only 
when a government chooses to provide some form of organization for them. 
C. Level of Support from Receiving State 
 In addition to the interests and capabilities of the refugee population, it is important to 
investigate the effects of the level of support from the receiving state for refugee militarization. Support 
can come in a multitude of forms, but I will break it down into financial, military, and political support. 
Accurate data can be difficult to assemble on this factor because the receiving state may be secretive in 
its assistance to refugees. In light of this difficulty, I will provide as much information as possible and 
base my analysis off that information.   
Uganda 1959-1964 
 Violence in Rwanda towards Tutsis led to significant exoduses to Uganda during 1959-1961, 
1963-1964, and in 1973.100 Gerard Prunier provides data estimating the number of Rwandan refugees 
that fled to Uganda from 1959-1964 at 78,000.101 However, Uganda made it quite clear that it did not 
support any political or military goals of the refugees that involved violence or conducting cross-border 
attacks against the new Hutu-led government of Rwanda. When the attempted government-in-exile for 
the Tutsi refugees was breaking up in 1962, Gabriel Sebyeza left his postion as Minister of Information 
for the UNAR and formed the Parti Socialiste Rwandais (PSR) in Uganda. By 1964 though, Uganda had 
banned the PSR.102 This left no room for militarization to take hold among the Rwandan refugees in 
Uganda. 
                                                          
100
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 
101 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 63. 
102




 That refugee population developed close ties with Yoweri Museveni and the NRA during the 
1970s and 1980s. Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema, two of the founding members and leaders of the 
RPF, were for awhile the Chief of Intelligence for the NRA and Uganda’s Minister of Defense 
respectively.103 As popular Ugandan opposition to hosting Rwandan refugees grew during the 1980s, the 
refugees chose to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987.104 
 By 1990, Rwandan refugees in Uganda had developed strong ties with the Ugandan 
government. Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema had obtained top positions in the NRA’s military 
apparatus, and many other Rwandans had obtained important posts in the NRA-led Ugandan 
government. Publicly, Yoweri Museveni had to distance himself from the Rwandan refugees when he 
took power in 1986, but he was still very much indebted to the Rwandans for their contributions to the 
NRA and the insurgency from 1981-1986. When the Ugandan government expelled the Rwandan 
refugees in October 1990, it provided substantial military and logistical assistance to the RPF. 
 Yoweri Museveni’s relationship with the RPF merits some explanation. This is because it is not 
immediately apparent why he would publicly distance himself from Rwandans after they had played 
such a crucial role in bringing him to power. The key to this puzzle lies in what Mahmood Mamdani calls 
“the politics of indigeneity.”105 Since the Rwandan refugees started flowing into Uganda from 1959-
1964, successive Ugandan governments have considered the children of refugees to be refugees. This 
stands in stark contrast to other countries in the region. In Zaire, refugees were at times, though not 
always, offered citizenship. In Tanzania, refugees could receive citizenship fairly easily. The Tanzanian 
government even set aside a separate district for the refugees where they could have access to land for 
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livelihood.106 On top of this basic unwillingness to incorporate refugees into Ugandan society, tensions 
between average Ugandans and Rwandese refugees grew when the refugees overflowed camp 
boundaries and when Ugandans realized that the refugees were getting benefits from the UN 
recognition they were receiving that the Ugandans could not access. Namely, the refugees had access to 
significantly more aid than they did. Many Rwandan refugees took advantage of UNHCR scholarships to 
receive advanced education and skills. These refugees were then able to get jobs in Nairobi, Kampala, or 
even in the United States or Europe.107 Naturally, this created a lot of jealousy. In addition, the benefits 
they were able to receive still did not remove the social stigma of being refugees. During the insurgency 
from 1981-1986, propaganda efforts from the Obote regime characterized the NRA, with some degree 
of accuracy, as a Banyarwanda (Rwandan) organization. This link stuck with the Ugandan populace when 
the NRA took power, which was a problem for an organization that knew from the start that it did not 
command the support of a majority of Ugandans. The NRA knew that it had to build a coalition. In order 
for that to happen, it quickly became clear that the NRA had to become less friendly to the refugees. 
This led to an extended process of removing Rwandans from leadership positions. That process reached 
a peak in 1988, when Fred Rwigyema, the commander-in-chief, was removed from his post. Tensions 
came to a head in August 1990 when a squatter uprising broke out. Political discourse in response to the 
uprising blamed Museveni’s government for favoring non-indigenous Rwandans over indigenous 
Ugandans with its land policy. These events ended discussion of possible naturalization of the refugees. 
For both the refugees, who had been ill-received by indigenous Ugandans for years, and for Museveni’s 
government, an armed return of the refugees to Rwanda appeared to be the most prudent option. Thus, 
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Museveni quietly supported an armed invasion of Rwanda by the refugees. This would allow him to 
garner support among indigenous Ugandans while remaining supportive to the refugees.108 
 Soon before the invasion, Fred Rwigyema, who had been removed from his post as commander-
in-chief of the armed forces in 1988, ordered troops to assemble near the border with Rwanda. 
Technically, he was no longer allowed to order troop movements after being removed from the 
commander-in-chief position, but Rwigyema was on such good terms with the Ugandan government 
that he was able to easily brush off questions by saying that he had ordered the troop movements to 
prepare for the military parade to celebrate the Ugandan Independence Day (October 9). Nobody even 
checked with State House to determine whether Rwigyema’s explanation was true or not.109 
  When the invasion began on October 1, 1990, RPF forces managed to take a lot of weapons and 
equipment with them from Uganda. RPF soldiers had heavy machine-guns, mortars, BM-21 multiple 
rocket-launchers, recoilless rifles and Russian ZUG light automatic cannons. A few of President 
Museveni’s bodyguards had even stolen the presidential staff radio communication vehicles. They had 
not managed to steal any heavy artillery or armored vehicles, and they only had limited supplies of fuel 
and ammunition, but they were expecting a short war.110 In addition, RPF forces were able to use 
Uganda as a rear base for their military activities.111 
 Uganda publicly gave the appearance that it did not provide any support to the RPF. On the day 
of the invasion, the Ugandan government declared that all Rwandese who had left the NRA to attack 
Rwanda would be considered deserters under the army’s Operational Code of Conduct. Uganda’s 
ambassador to the United States explained that “on conviction by a court martial, they *Rwandese 
deserters+ would be punishable by death. This is no incentive for them to cross back into Uganda.” 
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Uganda claimed no involvement in RPF military activities, and statements like this portrayed a lack of 
involvement. However, President Museveni admitted otherwise to fellow heads of state at a meeting in 
Harare. He acknowledged that the Rwandese in the NRA had notified him in advance “of their intention 
to organize to regain their rights in Rwanda,” but they had launched the invasion “without prior 
consultation.” Museveni went on to point out the Ugandan government’s pessimism about the RPF’s 
chances of victory. He explained that Uganda thus decided “to help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), 
materially, so that they are not defeated because that would have been detrimental to the Tutsi people 
of Rwanda and would not have been good for Uganda’s stability.”112 This is about the closest a state 
would ever get to admitting something like this. Uganda clearly supported the RPF’s invasion of Rwanda, 
and it seems that the Ugandan government’s support under Museveni’s leadership is an important 
factor into why refugee militarization occurred. 
 
Burundi 1959-1964 
 When the Rwandan refugees arrived in Burundi, they arrived in a country with similar 
proportions of Hutu and Tutsi people as Rwanda. However, unlike Rwanda, there was not a single ethnic 
group that solidly controlled Burundi in the early to mid 1960s. Power changed hands multiple times 
between Hutu and Tutsi leadership. Meanwhile, Burundi’s relationship with Rwanda was not always 
friendly. As I discussed earlier, Burundi’s feelings toward Rwanda soured after it failed to reach an 
agreement with Rwanda over the sharing of reserve currencies at a conference in Gisenyi in late 1963. 
This combination of rotating leadership between Hutus and Tutsis and fluctuating cordiality of relations 
between Rwanda and Burundi caused Burundi’s level of support for the refugees’ political and military 
goals to vary over time. 
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 Between 1961 and January 1965, the post of prime minister changed hands between Hutu and 
Tutsi politicians four times. Until 1963, UNAR was preparing its forces in Burundi. The weakness of 
Burundi’s local and provincial governments allowed this to happen relatively easily. Then in 1963 the 
UNAR decided to launch a major armed attack into Rwanda. They were hoping to seize power in Kigali. 
This led to them organizing 1500 refugees to march toward the border with Rwanda in November 1963. 
The refugees were mostly armed with spears, bows, and arrows. UNAR leader Francois Rukeba was 
arrested and jailed shortly before the attack. Burundi authorities found large amounts of arms and 
ammunition in Rukeba’s house in Bujumbura. The arms and ammunition had allegedly been stolen from 
Congolese rebels and were meant to be sent to the attacking force of refugees. Thanks to warnings from 
missionaries and UN officials, the Burundi gendarmerie was able to stop the refugees. There was no 
battle between the Burundi forces and refugees. Instead, the Burundi forces confiscated the spears, 
bows and arrows, and offered free rides back to the refugees’ residences.113 
 At that point in time, the Burundi government was on relatively good terms with the Rwandan 
government. This was aided by the fact that Burundi’s Prime Minister was Hutu. The ethnic affinity with 
Rwanda’s government seems to have contributed to a positive relationship between the two 
governments. That friendliness eroded though in early December 1963. This is because the conference 
held in Gisenyi at that time to discuss the terms of the dissolution of the customs and monetary union 
between Burundi and Rwanda failed miserably. The conference ended in total deadlock because the two 
countries failed to find a mutually agreeable formula for the sharing of reserve currencies. Burundi 
wanted a 60-40 split in its favor, while Rwanda wanted a 50-50 split. Burundi felt betrayed by Rwanda’s 
attitude at the conference, feeling that it had done enough of a favor for Rwanda in preventing the 
refugees from attacking in November to merit a concession. This souring of relations, as well as 
                                                          
113
 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 220. 
56 
 
improved coordination, allowed UNAR forces to launch a full attack on December 21, 1963.114 The attack 
failed, but it still showed that Burundi was less willing to obstruct the political and military goals of the 
refugees at the end of December 1963 than it had been even in November 1963. 
  In March 1964, Mwami Mwambutsa of Burundi dismissed the Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre 
Ngendadumwe, replacing him with a Tutsi, Albin Nyamoya. The change was made because 
communications were circulated claiming that the Mwami (King) was planning to dismiss four Hutu 
members of Ngendadumwe’s cabinet, sow discord among the Barundi, and that the Mwami was 
hoarding his money in Switzerland. Nobody has admitted to circulating these communications, and both 
Hutu elites and Tutsi elites had strategic reasons to do this, but the Mwami regardless elected to dismiss 
the four cabinet members in question and request that Ngendadumwe form a new cabinet. However, 
Ngendadumwe was unable to form a new cabinet, so the Mwami replaced him with Nyamoya as Prime 
Minister.115 
 Nyamoya and his supporters, in part due to their ethnic bond as Tutsis, were strong allies with 
the Rwandan refugees. The Nyamoya government viewed the refugees as a source of support against 
Hutus. Moreover, it viewed them as crucial allies in the event of a violent confrontation with local Hutu 
populations. The refugees were an important source of support to assist Nyamoya’s Tutsi government to 
obtain power and maintain it, and the Nyamoya government reciprocated by allowing arms and 
ammunition to flow through Burundi. Much of the shipments of arms and ammunition were meant for 
Congolese rebels, but some shipments were sent to the Tutsi refugees as well. These shipments were 
kept quiet until mid-December 1964, when a convoy of fourteen trucks was intercepted by elements of 
the Burundi army under Belgian command. The trucks were transporting 80 tons of weapons and 
ammunitions of Chinese and Russian origin. Included in the shipment were 500 Kalashnikov rifles, 30 
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Simonov rifles, nine 75 MM cannons, nine 82 MM mortars, and an undetermined number of anti-aircraft 
guns. The Mwami quickly withdrew his support for Nyamoya and replaced him with Ngendadumwe.116 
 The change of leadership did not remain in effect for long. On January 15, 1965, a Tutsi refugee 
assassinated Ngendadumwe.117 This act illustrated the close alliance that had developed between 
Burundi’s Tutsi elite and the Tutsi refugees. It also showed just how ethnically polarized the country had 
become. The two factions competing for power were divided largely along Hutu-Tutsi lines, and 
Ngendadumwe’s assassination proved just how far the competition could go. 
 As for determining Burundi’s level of support for the Rwandan refugees, it should be clear that 
this factor changed over time. Its support increased when relations with Rwanda worsened and when 
Tutsis acquired power. When Hutus were in power and relations with Rwanda were strong, Burundi was 
not supportive of the refugees. The political and military mobilization that did occur was able to happen 
because of Burundi’s weak local and provincial governments. Therefore, when looking for causal 
explanations of the limited militarization that did take place in Burundi, it appears that Burundi did not 
do a lot to directly support militarization. Instead, it provided a permissive environment for refugee 
militarization to take place. For the most part, UNAR and the Tutsi refugees were unable to capitalize. 
Tanzania 1994 
 Tanzania has developed a reputation on the African continent as one of the most generous 
refugee-receiving states. In 1983, Tanzania’s president, Julius Nyerere, received UNHCR’s Nansen Medal 
for Tanzania’s exemplary record of hosting refugees. At the ceremony, Nyerere offered Tanzanian 
citizenship and grants of land to all refugees facing permanent exile, which thousands of people 
accepted. Some of the refugees, such as those from Burundi and Rwanda, were accepted solely on 
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humanitarian grounds. Others, such as those from the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, were 
accepted as an act of political solidarity with the oppressed.118  
 None of the refugee populations Tanzania had hosted in the 20th century was as large, or came 
as rapidly, as the Rwandan refugee population. In one 24-hour period in late April 1994, approximately 
170,000 Rwandans crossed the border to enter Tanzania. Thousands more came in the following 
months. The influx overwhelmed Tanzania because even though it had grown accustomed to hosting 
refugees, it had never seen such a large and rapid refugee influx. In total, over half a million Rwandan 
refugees fled to Tanzania. The near half million Burundian and Zairian refugees who eventually joined 
them only made matters worse.119 Such a large refugee population would have been a major challenge 
for any country to handle.     
 Tension quickly built in Tanzania about how to respond to the waves of displaced people seeking 
refugee status. That tension though, grew in prominence for several reasons. For starters, previous 
refugee populations from Southern Africa’s liberation wars and Mozambique’s civil conflict repatriated 
to their home countries. Rwandans and Burundians appeared to be fleeing unending crises, thereby 
presenting a long-term burden to Tanzania.120 In addition, Tanzania changed from a policy of Ujamaa 
(community living) and Self Reliance to a multi-party political system, market economy, and a more 
open press in the 1990s. This change decreased emphasis on the community, increased the ability of 
Tanzanians to vocally oppose Tanzania’s generous refugee policy, and turned land into a highly sought-
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after commodity that Tanzanians were not willing to give away to refugees.121 Finally, the most obvious 
reason for tension was the large number of refugees. Tanzania’s deputy Home Affairs Minister E. 
Mwambulukutu summed up the concerns well in a speech he gave in 1996: 
 “Hosting refugees has become a heavier and more painful burden than ever before to countries 
 of asylum like Tanzania. Protecting and assisting refugees has brought new risks to national 
 security, exacerbated tensions between states and caused extensive damage to the 
 environment…”122 
 Professor Beth Elise Whitaker argues that the most important factors driving Tanzanian refugee 
policy by 1996 though were not related to any democratic pressures. Instead, she argues that regional 
security, Rwandan politics, and international funding levels were the three interrelated factors that 
drove the Tanzanian government’s decision to repatriate the Rwandan refugees.123 It was certainly no 
secret that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government that took power in Rwanda in July 1994 saw 
the massive refugee camps along its borders as a major security threat. Many of the organizers of the 
genocide had managed to escape to the camps, and had continued anti-Tutsi and anti-RPF activities. The 
regional agreements made in January 1995, February 1995, and November 1995 all stressed the 
importance of separating the guilty génocidaires from innocent refugees, but international assistance 
levels for this specific task were insufficient to follow through on the agreements. The lack of 
international action led to the decision of the RPF by 1996 to announce that it would take unilateral 
action to eliminate the threats at its borders if the international community proved unable to do so. In 
October and November 1996, it proved just how serious it was by attacking the camps in eastern Zaire. 
With the invasion of Zaire in mind, Tanzania took the visit from a Rwandan envoy to Dar es Salaam on 
November 21, 1996 very seriously. Details of the meeting have not been released, but informed people 
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commented that the envoy expressed Rwandan willingness to receive the refugees, even without the 
separation of intimidators from the general refugee population, and assured the Tanzanian government 
that refugees would not be killed when they arrived in Rwanda. This assurance put the Tanzanian 
government’s fears of serving the refugees up for slaughter at ease. This combined with Tanzania’s 
desire to avoid getting entangled in the regional conflict as the deciding factors in Tanzania’s decision to 
forcibly repatriate the Rwandan refugees.124 
 On December 5, 1996, Tanzania’s generosity ended toward the Rwandan refugees. On that day, 
the Tanzanian government and the Office of UNHCR issued a joint statement announcing that they 
expected all Rwandan refugees to return home by December 31, 1996. After having developed its 
reputation for years as a safe haven in a troubled region, Tanzanians appear to have just run out of 
patience.125 The Tanzanian government tried to convey a different picture of the situation. The District 
Commissioner of Karagwe District said at a UNDP coordination meeting: 
 “I wish to call upon the support of all NGOs because this [repatriation] exercise has been put 
 into gear. During my recent visit to the refugee camps, nearly all of the refugees showed a 
 positive response towards going home. It is the feeling of the Tanzanian government that these 
 people leave orderly, they leave in dignity, and that there is full coordination between the 
 Government of Tanzania, UNHCR, and all NGOs. … After the events which took place in Zaire, … 
 it’s high time everybody encourages these refugees to go back home. They’ve been here for two 
 and a half years now, and that’s enough time. They should go home.”126 
However, the refugees were unwilling to return to Rwanda until they could assess the level of success 
for the integration of returnees from Zaire. This created a situation where thousands of refugees tried to 
flee to Uganda and Kenya instead. Thousands more tried fleeing east, away from Rwanda. UNHCR did 
what it could to prevent these movements, hosting food distributions in the camps and sending out 
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trucks to round up some refugees and return them to the camps. The Tanzanian army took care of the 
rest by setting up roadblocks and blocking the movement of Rwandan refugees. The army then 
proceeded to herd the refugees toward Rwanda and close the refugee camps. Except for vulnerable 
groups (pregnant women, children, the elderly), most refugees travelled on foot. For a repatriation that 
was so clearly involuntary, it is striking that UNHCR contributed more than $1.5 million to the operation. 
Water and biscuits were distributed to the departing refugees, easing some of the burden of their 
journey.127 Regardless, the Rwandan refugees were placed in a difficult situation through their 
involuntary repatriation. Resentments and grudges from the genocide still existed, and the refugees had 
a lot of reason to fear how the Rwandan government would treat them. 
 To be clear, Tanzania’s generosity had already begun to decline. In March 1995, the Tanzanian 
government elected to close the borders with Burundi and Rwanda when 40,000 people tried to flee 
into Tanzania. During a presentation to Parliament, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation said, “We are saying enough is enough. Let us tell the refugees that time has come for 
them to return home and no more should come.”128 There ensued a flood of criticism that Tanzania was 
not upholding its obligations under international conventions, but the Tanzanian government had made 
up its mind. Tanzania’s hospitality did not end with that event, as evidenced by the decision to admit 
another 15000 refugees in mid-January 1996 when violence escalated in Burundi, but it did begin a 
trend of decreasing hospitality to refugees.129 
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 For all the flaws of how refugee populations were handled by Tanzania in the mid 1990s, 
Tanzania was able to avoid a situation of refugee militarization like what Zaire experienced. Sarah 
Lischer points out many differences in how the response worked in Tanzania as opposed to how it 
worked in Zaire. For instance, while Zaire was unwilling to accept international assistance with securing 
its border and was incapable of securing the border itself, Tanzania was able to provide tight border 
security and maintain order in the refugee camps. The Tanzanian government also did not sympathize 
with the refugees’ military goals, contrasting with Mobutu’s open support of the refugees.130 Lischer 
then contends that the reasons for Tanzania to allow the Rwandan refugees into the country and then 
to discourage military activity were that Tanzania had had positive past experiences with asylum 
seekers, Tanzania had relatively neutral relationships with Hutu and Tutsi people, and there was 
domestic political pressure to control the refugees’ activity.131 
Zaire 1994 
 Mobutu’s administration was very friendly to the refugees. His alliance with President 
Habyarimana had been so strong that he sent several hundred members of the Division Spéciale 
Présidentielle to Rwanda in October 1990 to assist Habyarimana’s government in fending off the RPF 
invasion from Uganda.132 After the refugees arrived in Zaire, the Zairian government allowed the 
Rwandan Armed Forces to have access to weapons and military hardware that it had brought from 
Rwanda. Many weapons were seized by the Zairian army as the refugees crossed the border, but they 
were largely kept in military camps under the supervision of ex-FAR soldiers. Therefore, it was not 
difficult for militants to obtain access to the weapons. Furthermore, the Zairian government ignored 
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calls to arrest the perpetrators of the genocide. It instead gave them freedom of movement and some 
active support. Some arms shipments to the Rwandan Armed Forces were directly facilitated by Zaire, 
while others were tacitly permitted. Even though this was difficult to prove, Human Rights Watch Arms 
Project was able to find evidence of two arms shipments worth about $330,000 that had been flown in 
on Air Zaire aircraft.133 
 Early in 1995, Zaire did send 1500 troops to the refugee camps to try and quell the violence in 
the refugee camps. Sending the troops may be argued by some as a sign that Zaire did not support 
refugee militarization, but a closer look reveals that its concern was really in trying to quell violence 
within the camps. The goals of Zairian troops when they were deployed were to “*improve+ public order 
in the camps, [prevent] intimidation and violence aimed at deterring the voluntary return of refugees, 
*protect+ humanitarian facilities and personnel, and *escort+ refugee convoys to the Rwandan border.”134 
None of these goals mention anything about preventing refugee militarization. Zaire may have decided 
to oppose refugee militarization, but the change in preferences most likely occurred due to international 
condemnation of the refugee crisis and Zaire’s desire to avoid alienating the international community.  
Pakistan during the Soviet invasion 
 Pakistan played a vital role in steering aid resources towards the militants and in making sure 
that the Afghan militant groups supported Pakistani interests. In her discussion of how the political 
organization of state-in-exile refugees is able to persuade foreign donors to provide humanitarian 
assistance to their respective refugee population, Sarah Lischer highlights the importance of their ability 
to formulate internationally appealing political arguments and publicity campaigns. These efforts have 
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proven quite successful for many refugee populations.135 In the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the 
Pakistani government enthusiastically took on this role for them.136 Days after the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan, senior officials in Pakistan held a meeting to discuss their options. The officials agreed that 
Pakistan should publicly protest the Soviet invasion, but avoid overt military action. Pakistan’s Foreign 
Minister at the time, Agha Shahi, explained the rationale for this option by explaining that it was: 
 “… the one dictated by the geopolitical circumstances of the region. Admittedly, this course was 
 difficult to sustain, especially in the deteriorating political climate of East-West relations. The 
 emotional urge to demonstrate Islamic solidarity in full measure had to be restrained as a 
 military solution to the problem was out of the question. The only hope of withdrawal of the 
 Soviet forces lay in mobilizing the force of international public opinion and concerting political 
 and diplomatic pressure against the Soviet military intervention.”137 
At least, this is the policy that Pakistan publicly followed. It is well-documented that Pakistan covertly 
chose to support the Afghan refugees with arms, funding, and logistical assistance.138 Pakistan’s actions 
therefore allowed it to be the hub for billions of dollars in aid money and divert attention away from its 
nuclear program, which had motivated Jimmy Carter to impose an aid ban on Pakistan in 1978 and 1979. 
With its position of control over aid resources, Pakistan was able to choose which resistance groups 
would become prominent. Pakistan chose to recognize seven Afghan resistance groups. One group in 
particular, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, received the largest share of assistance. However, the 
broader trend was that fundamentalist groups received more resources than moderate groups.139 
Iran during the Soviet invasion 
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 Iran was confident in its own ability to host refugees, and had enough suspicion of the West to 
want to avoid accepting assistance from it. Its goals in managing the refugee population were 
maintaining security and using the refugees as a source of cheap labor to contribute to 
industrialization.140 Also, it was involved in a long war with Iraq. From September 1980 until 1988 Iran 
and Iraq fought one of the most brutal and massive wars of the twentieth century. Over one million 
people died, both sides suffered extreme financial costs, and foreign powers got involved on both 
sides.141 With this conflict occurring, Iran had absolutely no desire to deal with military activity on its 
opposite border. 
 Iran did provide limited support to Shiite Afghans against the Soviets. This assistance was limited 
though by its focus on the war with Iraq, which it viewed as its number one national security priority. 
This meant that there were few resources to support the political and military goals of the refugees. It is 
also doubtful for strategic reasons that Iran would have given extensive support to the refugees’ political 
and military goals even if it had the resources to do so. This is because that likely would have meant 
escalating the conflict and creating more refugees. Iran was already hosting at least 2 million Afghan 
refugees for much of the 1980s. It had no desire to host more. Furthermore, Iran did not want to face 
retaliation from the Soviet Union. The costs of incurring Soviet wrath would have been tremendous. The 
situation would have required Iran to seek American support, as it was the only country truly powerful 
enough to stand up to Soviet power. That option, ideologically, was impossible.142 
Broader Analysis 
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 In analyzing these cases, it does seem that refugee populations are not likely to militarize if the 
receiving state does not want them to militarize. In Pakistan, Zaire, and Uganda, the refugee 
militarization that has occurred came when the receiving states were at least permissive of refugee 
militarization. Mobutu was not able to provide much in the way of financial or military assistance to 
militants among the Rwandan refugees, but he did give them freedom of movement and he refused to 
arrest genocide perpetrators. Plus, he campaigned to the international community on behalf of the 
refugees. Pakistan and Uganda have both provided financial and military support to refugees. Pakistan 
also provided political support for refugees on its territory, while Museveni had to publicly distance 
himself from the RPF. This variable does appear to be a significant factor in determining whether 
refugee militarization will occur. 
 Furthermore, the level of support from the receiving state appears more important than the 
type of refugee population. A supportive receiving state can help a persecuted or state-in-exile refugee 
population undergo refugee militarization. It can turn highly disorganized militant elements within a 
refugee population into a powerful fighting force (such as what happened in the Afghan refugee camps 
in Pakistan). However, a state-in-exile refugee population cannot undergo refugee militarization if the 









Table 2: Refugee Type vs. Receiving State Response 
 State-in-exile refugee 
population 
Persecuted refugee population 
Receiving state supports 
militarization 
 All refugee populations 
militarized 
- Uganda in 1990 
supported RPF 
militarization  
- Zaire in 1994 supported 
ex-FAR and Interahamwe 
militarization 
- Serbia in 1994 supported 
Abdic’s Bosnian refugees 
in their militarization 
- Pakistan in the 1980s 
supported the 
mujahideen 
Receiving State opposes 
militarization 
 Zaire in 1995 was the 
only country in this row 
hosting refugee 
militarization143 
- Croatia in 1995 opposed 
militarization of Abdic’s 
refugees 
- Zaire in 1995 opposed 
ex-FAR and Interahamwe 
militarization 
- Tanzania in 1994 
opposed militarization of 
Rwandan refugees 




 The best example of this situation comes from Fikret Abdic’s Bosnian Muslim refugee population 
from the town of Velika Kladusa in Bihac municipality. This refugee population included about 25,000 
refugees. While often overlooked in discussions about the Bosnian War and the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
the intra-ethnic conflict between Abdic’s Muslim followers and Bosniacs who controlled the government 
in Sarajevo is a very useful case study to understand refugee militarization. During the 1980s, Abdic 
successfully transformed Bihac from one of the poorest areas in Yugoslavia into a highly profitable 
industrial center. His company, Agrokomerc, came to control nearly every aspect of the economy. 
Abdic’s ability to provide quality employment and a high standard of living allowed him to cultivate a 
large loyal following. This support was so strong that it nearly made him Bosnia’s president in 1991.144 
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He was also extremely skilled at forming alliances. Despite war breaking out between Serbia and Croatia 
in 1991, he was able to count elements on both sides as allies. Emma Daly observed: 
 The Abdic empire, built around Agrokomerc, depended on a dangerous and delicate web of 
 trade links, involving Croatia (which gave Mr. Abdic a free port in Rijeka), its Serbian enemies in 
 Knin, the Bosnian Serb army besieging fellow Muslims in the Bihac pocket, and Belgrade.145 
 Abdic continued to prosper during the war between Croatians and Bosnian Muslims in 1993. 
Croatia and the Serbs allegedly tried to use Abdic to pursue their own goals. “For the Serbs, Bihac was 
the missing link needed to join Serb-held land in Croatia and Bosnia to Serbia itself, which is what 
Croatia wanted to avoid at all costs.”146 Croatian tolerance for Abdic’s behavior and Abdic’s easy 
acquisition of Croatian citizenship may have occurred because Abdic provided intelligence about Serb 
positions to the Croatian government, though stories of that are unconfirmed.147 However, when Abdic 
declared autonomy in September 1993, the United States and Germany pressured Croatia into siding 
with Bosnia.148 This is why, starting with the exodus of Abdic and his 25,000 refugees in 1994, Abdic’s 
refugees were friendly with Serbia and opposed by Croatia. 
 Abdic’s refugee population succeeded in fighting its way back into Bihac in early 1995, but was 
forced back out again in August 1995. During both periods of exile, the refugees easily fit the 
classification of a state-in-exile refugee population. Describing the refugees in 1994, UNHCR 
commented: 
 *Abdic’s supporters+ sought to pressure others to leave, and are pressuring them not to return. 
 They exercise effective control over the camps. There are those who fled fearing for their lives 
 as the [Bosnian] army advanced, often reacting to false rumors spread by the first group, a 
 propaganda campaign that began well before the final advance. Others, as witnessed by UNHCR, 
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 did not want to flee but were pressured to do so. And there were those who had long intended 
 to leave and saw this as an opportunity.149 
  These conditions did not change when the refugees fled for a second time in 1995. This is a good 
comparison to use for this analysis because the two episodes are within the same conflict, with the 
same refugees, and therefore the same ethnicities at play. During the first refugee crisis, which began in 
August 1994, Abdic’s refugees were split between camps in Turanj and Batnoga. Batnoga was solidly 
within Serb-held Krajina, and Turanj was on the border between Krajina and Croatia. Croatia did not 
support ambitions to militarize the refugee camp in Turanj, but it was not able to prevent armament on 
the other side of the border with Krajina. Serbia provided Abdic’s refugees with extensive support for 
their militarization. In total, Abdic was able to get about 10,000 refugees to join his army. These 
refugees were seen as a valuable asset by the Serbians, who intended to invade Bosnia. Serbian 
assistance was crucial in allowing Abdic’s forces to assemble the necessary resources to militarize. The 
map below illustrates the area in 1994. By the time of the next crisis, Croatia had defeated the Krajina 
Serbs and cut off Abdic’s source of military support. Croatia had recently entered into an alliance with 
the Bosnian government, so it was not willing to allow the refugees to militarize. Abdic still had 
extensive political control over the camps in the second refugee crisis, but without Serb support he was 
not able to get the refugees to militarize again.150 
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D. Pre-existing conflicts within the receiving state 
 My discussion of pre-existing conflicts within the receiving state will focus on the political 
legitimacy of the receiving state, level of politicization of ethnic identities, and the leadership’s political 
calculus of maintaining power. The situation in each receiving country for refugees is different, making it 
necessary to analyze each specific country individually to learn about their own specific situations. 
Uganda 1959-1964 
 As Rwandan refugees were flowing into Uganda during this time period, the dynamics within 
Uganda were conducive to preventing refugee militarization. The government had legitimacy among the 
people, and its hold on power relied on appealing to the “politics of indigeneity.” In other words, the 
Ugandan government knew that it had to promote the interests of indigenous Ugandans first. 
Indigenous Ugandans did not want to get involved in Rwanda’s troubles, so the government avoided 
them. This means that there was some politicization of ethnic identities, but in this case the 
politicization worked as a means to help prevent refugee militarization. The leadership calculus of 
Uganda’s leader was also best served by preventing refugee militarization, and the potential blowback 
that could cause. 
Uganda 1990 
 Yoweri Museveni’s government in Uganda did have some trouble establishing its political 
legitimacy. When it came to power in 1986, it knew that it did not have the backing of a majority of 
Ugandans. Moreover, an important source of support for the NRA was the Banyarwandan refugee 
population. Indigenous Ugandans were uneasy with that, and Museveni knew that he had to appease 
indigenous Ugandans in order to consolidate power over the country. Here, Museveni knew that to stay 
in power and maintain the government’s legitimacy, his most attractive option was to support the 
return of Banyarwandan refugees to Rwanda. Since the refugee leadership was not willing to return to 
72 
 
Rwanda peacefully, Museveni had to give them enough support to allow them to forcefully enter 
Rwanda.  
Burundi 1959-1964 
 The political legitimacy of the Burundi state was relatively strong. The Mwami was the most 
powerful figure in government, but most of the government’s work was handled by the prime minister 
and his cabinet. The prime minister position changed hands numerous times from 1959-1964, and for 
years afterward. Through all of those changes though, the Mwami maintained final say over policy. 
When the Mwami decided that he was not happy with the prime minister at that particular time, he had 
no problem just dismissing that particular politician and putting a new prime minister in place. 
Furthermore, the Mwami was able to use his power to expel Chinese diplomats from Burundi in January 
1965 after learning of Ngendadumwe’s assassination.151 As discussed earlier, the Burundi state was not 
especially strong, but the Mwami did not have to worry about his grip on power. 
 While the climate in Burundi was relatively stable, certain elements of the Burundi state made it 
easier for militants to arm themselves. Burundi had similar proportions of Hutu and Tutsi as Rwanda. 
Plus, as in Rwanda, Tutsis filled a disproportionate amount of the elite positions in Burundi society. 
Before Rwanda’s revolution in 1959, there were some differences between Tutsis and Hutus in Burundi, 
but those differences became highly politicized and led to substantial ethnic polarization when Rwandan 
refugees entered the country. Rwandan refugees affected the internal dynamics of Burundi in dramatic 
ways, and they forged alliances that contributed to their attempts at militarization. 
 Competition for power was occurring at the level of the prime minister and his cabinet. By 1963, 
power was split primarily along the lines of Hutus supporting Ngendadumwe and Tutsis supporting 
Nyamoya. Because of their ethnic solidarity as Tutsis and common experiences of being minorities in a 
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country in which they have a disproportionate share of the power and wealth, the Tutsis behind 
Nyamoya and the Tutsi Rwandan refugees quickly became close allies. The polarization reached its peak 
with the assassination of Ngendadumwe on January 12, 1965. Nyamoya’s government also knew that it 
needed the support of the Tutsi refugees to stay in power, so it worked to cultivate close relations with 
the Tutsi refugees. Meanwhile, Ngendadumwe’s government knew that it was most likely to obtain and 
keep power by keeping the refugees at bay. The only caveat to this dichotomy is that the armed forces, 
Hutu and Tutsi alike, felt somewhat threatened by the presence and potential militarization of the 
refugees. Military officers feared that the refugees would be able to usurp their role if they became too 
powerful.152 
Tanzania 1994 
 Tanzania, unlike Zaire, was undergoing a period of sincere political liberalization during the 
1990s. It had spent nearly 30 years under a regime of one-party state socialism, but started moving 
towards capitalism and a multi-party system in 1985. That was when Julius Nyerere stepped down from 
the presidency and allowed Ali Hassan Mwinyi to become president. Mwinyi put Tanzania on the path to 
becoming a capitalist multi-party democracy. Pressure had started building for change when the 
economy underwent a serious crisis. Its economic crisis had been brought on by the oil shocks of the 
1970s, a drop in world coffee prices, and inefficient state-centered economic policies. In response to 
these factors, donors and technocrats within the Tanzanian government pressured Nyerere to allow the 
Tanzanian government to change. 
 The first few years of Mwinyi’s presidency were focused on economic reforms. These reforms 
were made as part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even as Tanzania’s 
economic liberalization policies started profoundly affecting people, they did not generate widespread 
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opposition among the social groups they affected most. Price incentives were shifting in favor of 
agriculture and rural production, per capita GDP was rising, and optimism was growing about the 
economy. Growth was not evenly distributed among everyone, the government was investing less in 
social services, and Tanzania’s dependence on foreign donors was growing, but Tanzanians were still 
supporting economic liberalization.153 
 With these economic reforms, the idea of a one-party state weakened as Tanzania moved away 
from socialism. This led to President Mwinyi legalizing opposition parties in 1992. Multi-party national 
elections were held in 1995.154 These reforms were making the Tanzanian government more 
accountable to the people. The government had legitimacy in the eyes of Tanzanians, unlike in Zaire 
where the little bit of legitimacy the government possessed derived from external sources and support. 
 Tanzania also did not experience any notable politicization of ethnicity during the 1990s. 
Nyerere had successfully fostered a broad Tanzanian national identity that went above any so-called 
tribal competition and prevented politics from being conducted along ethnic lines. The adoption of 
Swahili as the national language, for example, was important in fostering the national identity. Whitaker 
even notes that Tanzanians in interviews actively sought to distinguish themselves from the 
Banyarwanda, Barundi, and Zairois when discussing politics in the region.155 Her finding is confirmed by 
Landou, who observed that Tanzanians in refugee-hosting areas articulated stronger nationalist 
sentiments than elsewhere. Their use of Swahili functioned as a sort of “restrictive code” that 
distinguished them from the refugees.156 
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 The political leadership of Tanzania also knew that its ability to maintain control of the 
government depended on its ability to provide peace and security. Whitaker notes how a poll conducted 
in 1995 found that, when asked to provide the single most important role of government, Tanzanians 
most commonly answered that peace and security were the most important things for the government 
to provide. Education, health care, and economic planning were all far behind in the polling results. This 
meant that Tanzania’s president at the time, Benjamin Mkapa, had to prove his party’s credentials at 
providing peace and security in the lead-up to Tanzania’s elections. Opposition parties had been 
legalized in 1992, so the ruling party found that it actually had to work at making its case to the public 
about why it should remain in power.157 
 All of this meant that when Rwandan refugees arrived, the number one concern of the 
Tanzanian government was in preventing the spread of conflict to western Tanzania. The government 
removed weapons from the refugee camps and increased security forces in surrounding areas. Later, 
when the refugees were becoming increasing threats to Tanzanian security, the Tanzanian government 
conducted a forced repatriation of the Rwandan refugees back to Rwanda. Even though this repatriation 
was in cooperation with UNHCR, it was in violation of international norms regarding the hosting of 
refugees. Many human rights groups criticized the Tanzanian government for its behavior, but it had 
already decided that it was more important to satisfy its own population’s demand for peace and 
security. This was how the regime was able to maintain power.    
Zaire 1994 
Mahmood Mamdani comments on the frequency of refugees going to Zaire by writing, 
“Conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu has it that Kivu Province in eastern Congo is where losers 
                                                          
157 Whitaker, "Refugees and the Spread of Conflict," 223. 
76 
 
traditionally end up, and it is from Kivu that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda.”158 René 
Lemarchand extensively discusses Burundi’s history, showing that its conflicts are closely related with 
Rwanda and Congo. In fact, thousands of Burundian refugees had recently arrived in Zaire when 
Rwandan refugees fled from Rwanda.159 They aggravated tensions that already existed in Zaire. 
Mobutu’s government had very little, if any, political legitimacy. It provided no state services, 
and produced an army that was a larger source of insecurity than security. An editorial in the Kenyan 
newspaper The Nation observed that: “By banning bribe-taking and intimidation and insisting on 
disciplined behavior by its own soldiers, the AFDL is bringing more order to daily life than many Zairians 
have seen in decades.”160 When the Cold War ended, Mobutu started receiving substantial criticism for 
human rights violations and corruption from all corners of the international community. In an attempt 
to calm domestic and international criticism, Mobutu made a show of allowing some political 
liberalization in 1991. He declared an end to the one-party state and finally convened a National 
Conference in August 1991. Both reforms were really just public relations gambits meant to quiet 
Mobutu’s critics though.161  Throughout this period, Mobutu maintained his hold on power. 
 Mobutu had a range of forces allied against him. Congolese nationalists had been waging a 
campaign against him since 1965.162 Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and later Angola all backed the Alliance 
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in order to protect regional security. These 
countries all viewed Zaire as a major source of insecurity for their respective societies.163 
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 Mobutu knew that he would not be able to rely upon the government’s armed forces to hold 
onto power. The Zairian army had a history of extortion and looting of the population, which was 
generally the only contact with the state for the civilian population. It was completely ineffective, 
appearing to serve solely for the benefit of the rich elites who could grab access to it.164 He was 
dependent upon other sources to maintain his grip on power. Rwandan refugees were crucial in 
acquiring the support he needed. At first, Mobutu planned to use the refugees as leverage with which to 
blackmail the international community to reintegrate his regime. This worked fairly well until 
international sentiment turned decidedly against the Hutu refugees in late 1994. 
 The only political legitimacy Mobutu had was with his foreign patrons and loyal elites. From the 
beginning of his military career, Mobutu had been receiving financial support from the Belgian 
government. At the beginning of the 1960s, the Congo suffered extensive in-fighting and violence. The 
Cold War was moving to Africa as well, and the United States was very conscious of the threat of 
Communist influence taking hold. This led the CIA to turn to Mobutu as the man it felt had the best 
chance of holding off the nationalist and communist elements within the country and of stabilizing the 
country in general.165 Mobutu claimed that the best way to achieve these goals was through centralizing 
power in a unified state.166 He clearly meant to utilize strong-man tactics to achieve order. He had little 
reason to believe, until December 1996, that his Western allies would not rally to his support.167 As for 
the elites, McNulty argues that Mobutu was able to maintain power by controlling money and 
controlling force. Mobutu stole almost a quarter of the Zairian government’s budget throughout the 
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1970s, creating a large source of patronage. His personal fortune also created a group of loyal elites who 
helped Mobutu maintain power.168 
 The United States had been the primary supporter of the Mobutu regime until 1975. It was then 
that French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing negotiated a number of cooperation agreements with 
Mobutu, including military cooperation. With this event, France became the primary supporter of 
Mobutu’s regime. Zaire had become part of France’s sphere of influence, changing hands in the 
continuing competition for control of Africa. Mobutu’s longevity in power can confidently be attributed 
to these agreements.169 
 When a rebellion began in late 1996 in Kivu Province, Mobutu was unable to secure French 
assistance in putting it down. France had been discredited as a peacekeeping force by its involvement in 
the region through Operation Turquoise.170 Mobutu was also unable to count on the assistance of the 
United States. By that time, the United States was allied with the RPF government in Rwanda. It viewed 
the refugees as a threat to regional stability, and Mobutu’s alliance with the génocidaires as contributing 
to regional insecurity. Mobutu’s regime was seen as a source of great danger for Zaire and for Central 
Africa.171 The United States did not get very involved with the Rwandan invasion or the rebellion against 
Mobutu, but it did make a conscious decision not to intervene on Mobutu’s behalf. With the United 
States fully in opposition to Mobutu and France politically unable to help, Mobutu had no choice but to 
turn to mercenaries and the refugees for help to stay in power.  
 Mobutu also turned ethnic diversity within Zaire into a political issue. From 1990-1993 and in 
1996, Mobutu actively incited unrest in Kivu and Shaba to demonstrate the precariousness of the 
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country he was in charge of, and the necessity of keeping him in charge of it.172 He did this by starting to 
enforce the citizenship law that was passed in 1981. The law stipulated that people had to prove that 
their ancestors had been on Congolese soil since the 1885 colonial division of Africa. The law was so 
impractical that it was not enforced until Mobutu started using it as a political weapon in the early 
1990s. His enforcement of the law successfully stirred up enough tensions between indigenous 
Congolese and Banyarwandans to spark periodic fighting in early 1993 in North Kivu. As the Rwandan 
civil war continued, divisions emerged between Hutu and Tutsi in the Congo. The influx of 
predominantly Hutu refugees made tensions even worse, as refugees joined the struggle against local 
Tutsi. The conflict was pretty successfully contained within North Kivu, but tensions were running 
extremely high.173 By 1996, the victimized people of eastern Zaire, namely the Banyamulenge, fought 
back. They were armed by Rwanda and Uganda primarily. Overthrowing Mobutu was the only course of 
action they believed could bring them a measure of stability and security.174 Mobutu had over-reached 
by calling for the expulsion of all Banyamulenge in September 1996.175 Mobutu had been a close ally of 
President Habyarimana, and so allowing the Hutu refugees to militarize and have freedom of movement 
was also a way to indirectly strike at the RPF government in Rwanda.176 
Pakistan during the Soviet invasion 
 The survival of Pakistan’s government was in serious doubt when General Zia ul-Haq came to 
power in 1977. By that point, Pakistan had a record of constitutional failure, institutional weakness, 
interethnic violence, and military rule since acquiring independence from Great Britain. Four 
constitutions had been implemented, martial law had been imposed twice, and there had been two 
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popular uprisings. In 1982 regional expert Professor Stephen Cohen voiced a common sentiment that 
“many Pakistanis and foreigners do not believe that Pakistan will survive in its present form beyond this 
decade.”177 Several other articles were also published with similar messages, such as “Pakistan: Living on 
the Edge,” “Dateline Pakistan: A Passage to Anarchy?,” “Pakistan: Chaos and Carnage,” “The Approach 
of Anarchy,” and “Pakistan: Bloodbath in the Streets.”178  
 Perhaps even more threatening to the Pakistani government’s legitimacy were rising irredentist 
claims to “Pashtunistan” from the influx of Afghan refugees from the Soviet invasion. The border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, also known as the Durand Line, was arbitrarily set with a treaty in 
1893. Afghanistan has never recognized it, and has supported irredentist claims to “Pashtunistan,” 
which would include much of Afghanistan and a substantial portion of Pakistan. If Pashtunistan were 
successfully created, Pakistan could expect to lose large amounts of land, people, and resources. Those 
losses would weaken its position in its conflict with India over Kashmir, a conflict Pakistan considers to 
hold the utmost importance. 
 India is already substantially more powerful in its own right than Pakistan. Both countries may 
have nuclear weapons, but in the mid 1980s India accounted for 77 percent of the population of South 
Asia, 72 percent of its land area, 81 percent of its gross national product, 66 percent of its military 
manpower, and 77 percent of its military expenditures.179 It was far ahead in scientific and technological 
feats as well. India orbited an earth satellite in 1980, making it the sixth country to successfully 
accomplish that feat. It also was far ahead of Pakistan in its development of nuclear technology, long 
range missiles and rockets, and it had the fourth largest armed force in the world. Pakistan’s military 
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was nothing to mock, having the ninth largest armed force in the world, but the difference was still 
noticeable. This is especially true in light of the fact that Pakistan did not win any of its three wars with 
India. In 1971, it suffered its worst defeat and was forced to watch its territory get partitioned and its 
population cut in half.180 These defeats and marked deficits in power have forced Pakistan to seek 
foreign alliances whenever possible to compete with India. 
 The relevance of Pakistan’s conflict with India to Afghan refugees is that Pakistan feared the 
possibility of India using the refugees as a weapon against Pakistan. The nightmare scenario was that 
India would provide military assistance to allow the Afghan refugees to forcibly pursue their ambition of 
creating Pashtunistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s government felt it was crucial to beat India to the punch 
and provide assistance to the refugees first. That would prevent the refugees from posing a dire threat 
to Pakistan’s security and the legitimacy of its government.181 
 Pakistan’s government did not pit different ethnic groups against each other. That would have 
been far too destabilizing of a policy choice to have ever been justified by its potential benefits. Instead, 
it sought to unify its citizens across ethnic groups by emphasizing Islam and encouraging citizens to 
actively practice the religion. In fact, Zia relied on Islamist elements such as the Jama’at-i-Islami party for 
political support during his first few years in power.182 This policy was extended to Afghan refugees, 
where the Pakistani government gave more assistance to political parties and militant groups that were 
outspokenly Muslim. Some secular groups did receive recognition and support from the Pakistani 
government, but not as much as the overtly Muslim groups. 
                                                          







 Lastly, the political calculus of General Zia to remain in power and to maintain the government’s 
authority over the Pakistani people revolved around protecting the security of Pakistan, preventing a 
rise of calls for “Pashtunistan,” and pursuing the conflict with India over Kashmir. General Zia knew that 
he could not allow Afghan refugees to get involved in or stir up any tensions within Pakistan. Supporting 
their militarization against the Soviet Union was one way to focus the refugees’ attention away from 
Pakistan. Additionally, preventing any popular movements for Pashtunistan would protect Pakistan from 
threats of losing territory, people, and resources. Perhaps most importantly, General Zia knew that the 
refugees could be utilized in Kashmir. This knowledge helped lead to the Pakistani government’s policy 
of contributing to refugee militarization, as well as involving Afghan refugees in the fighting for 
Kashmir.183 By pursuing these objectives, General Zia was able to maintain power in Pakistan. His own 
political calculus made it attractive for him to promote the militarization of Afghan refugees. 
Iran during the Soviet invasion 
 Because Iran underwent a revolution in 1979, the government had to assertively defend its 
legitimacy when Afghan refugees were arriving. The revolution had left Iran weaker than it had been for 
many years by the time it was complete. In fact, its power had diminished so much that many analysts 
felt Iraq had finally surpassed Iran in power. This perceived change in relative power was an important 
factor leading to Iraq launching its invasion of Iran in 1980.184 In retrospect, Iran actually still had a more 
powerful military. Its power though had declined dramatically at a time when Iraq’s power was growing, 
narrowing the gap in power to a smaller margin than had existed for years.185 Iraq’s invasion came at a 
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time when Ayatollah Khomeini’s government was still trying to consolidate power, so his government 
was seriously threatened. 
 Iran’s position was further imperiled by its lack of friends in the international community. Both 
the United States and the Soviet Union provided more support to Iraq than Iran during the Iran-Iraq 
War. Henry Precht, director of Iranian affairs at the United States State Department from 1978-1980, 
points out that the Soviet Union resumed direct military aid to Iraq in 1982 after Iran had pushed Iraqi 
forces off its territory and that the United States had in general held a pro-Iraq, anti-Iran position during 
the war.186 Also, Ayatollah Khomeini did not approve diplomatic relations broadly with the international 
community until late 1984. At that point, Iran finally established diplomatic relations with all countries 
except the United States, Israel, and South Africa.187 The only close friends Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime 
had on the international stage were Libya, Algeria, Syria, and a few liberation movements.188  
 In spite of such serious threats, the Iranian government was able to maintain legitimacy. It had 
come to power through a popular revolution, and its calls for wide adherence to Islam were widely 
supported. Plus, contrary to American perceptions throughout the 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime 
took a very pragmatic course of action when it came to power. While it took power amidst calls for 
exporting the Islamic revolution and may have actively sought to export revolution at first, its focus 
quickly turned inward. It adopted a largely pragmatic approach to accomplishing its objectives of 
establishing its independence, pursuing its war with Iraq, and opposing the United States. This included 
actions such as eliminating its foreign debt, seeking economic self-sufficiency, and being flexible enough 
in its foreign policy to work with countries it strongly disagreed with, including the Soviet Union. I have 
already observed that Iran did provide some assistance to Afghans in opposition the Soviet Union’s 
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invasion, but that assistance was kept at low levels. For the most part, Iran maintained a tense, but 
functioning, relationship with the Soviet Union. This was not the kind of policy that the American 
perception of an irrational, purely ideological Iranian regime would have predicted.189  
 Like Pakistan, Iran also did not have a politicization of ethnic identities. Under Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s government, Shia Islam was promoted as the unifying force of Iranians. Islam was extremely 
important politically, but it is important to recognize as a unifying force within Iran rather than a dividing 
one. Ayatollah Khomeini came to power thanks to a mass movement in support of returning Iran to solid 
Islamic values. It was a revolutionary government that talked extensively when it first came to power 
about exporting its revolution to other countries. Professor of Middle Eastern history Juan Cole has 
commented, “Khomeini did not envisage himself as making a revolution in one country… His ideology of 
clerical rule, rejection of the Western colonial heritage, he felt was a universal message.”190  
 The political calculus of its leadership brought it to the conclusion that refugee militarization 
was not a desired outcome. It had a war against Iraq to deal with, and the new regime was busy 
consolidating its power in the country. While the regime ideologically opposed the Soviet Union’s 
treatment of Muslims in Afghanistan and sympathized with their cause, Iran’s internal priorities and war 
with Iraq were more important to Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime.   
Broader Analysis 
 In all of the situations analyzed here, refugee militarization does appear to occur with some 
combination of a lack of legitimacy of the receiving state, politicization of ethnic identities, and a 
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political calculus of the leadership that finds refugee militarization to be a favorable outcome. In a quick 
glance at some other refugee populations, these factors appear to remain crucial. 
 Southern Africa supports this story very well. Despite civil wars in neighboring countries, Zambia 
and Malawi have remained relatively stable over time. Zambia has hosted thousands of Angolan 
refugees for decades, including more than 50,000 refugees from the Congo in recent years. The Zambian 
government has not always been popular, especially during the country’s economic crisis in the 1980s, 
yet its legitimacy and capacity to control the state have never been threatened. Ethnic identities have 
been a factor at times, but they have never been politicized to a great extent. The only exploitation that 
the Zambian government has attempted of the refugees has been in order to ask for increased 
international assistance. For Malawi, it started hosting significant numbers of refugees in the 1980s. 
Refugees were coming from Mozambique, and numbered more than one million by 1992. President 
Hastings Banda of Malawi continued his standard practice of enforcing tight control over the country as 
refugees arrived. This included controlling the distribution and management of aid. Banda was under 
pressure in the early 1990s to democratize, so the refugee influx was a welcome diversion and source of 
leverage for increased international assistance.191 
 These additional cases illustrate another point as well. The receiving state does not have to be a 
democracy to peacefully host refugees and prevent refugee militarization. It is possible that there are 
more cases of refugee militarization in autocracies than in democracies, but the correlation that may 
appear between democratization and refugee militarization should not be considered to indicate 
causality. As this section shows, both democracies and autocracies have prevented refugee 
militarization on numerous occasions. President Hastings Banda of Malawi and the Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
regime in Iran are just a couple examples of autocratic governments preventing refugee militarization. 
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This finding indicates that the presence or absence of democracy is most likely not related to refugee 
militarization. 
 The Horn of Africa region has been less successful in hosting refugees than Southern Africa, but 
it still has had some degree of success. Kenya has hosted large numbers of refugees from throughout 
the region, particularly from Somalia and Sudan. The Somali influx came during the administration of 
President Daniel Arap Moi. Moi’s government faced staunch criticism for its resistance to democratic 
reforms, but that resistance was made peacefully through official and government channels. Even 
though many people disagreed with government policy, the government still had enough legitimacy to 
have the opposition participate in it. Kenya has also seen some polarization along ethnic lines, such as in 
violence during the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections, but those events were unrelated to the refugees.192 
Now that Kenya has passed a new constitution, with a marked absence of violence during the 
referendum, the government appears to have more political legitimacy now than ever before. 
 In West Africa and Uganda, refugee militarization has been a serious issue for years. When 
viewed through the context of the factors of political legitimacy, politicization of ethnicity, and the 
political calculus of each country’s leadership though, this can be pretty easily explained. For Uganda, 
Yoweri Museveni’s government does not have complete control over the northern part of the country. 
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is the first rebel group to come to mind in that area, but there are 
others as well. Sudanese refugees have become ensnared in the conflict and contributed to instability in 
the area. It is also an area through which Uganda is able to support the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM). Sudan, on the other hand, has been documented at providing support to the LRA. 
Formal diplomatic agreements have been made between the two countries to stop funding militant 
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groups in each other’s countries, but violence has continued on each side of the border.193 In order for 
the conflict to get resolved, a lasting solution will likely need to be found to the refugee situation. For 
West Africa, conflict seems to have spread from Liberia’s civil war in the early 1990s to Sierra Leone, and 
later Guinea. In Sierra Leone, Major General Joseph Momoh was overseeing a transition to a multi-party 
system when Liberian refugees arrived. A military coup occurred when people got frustrated with 
Momoh’s response to the refugees. With the coup, the government’s legitimacy and control over the 
country declined rapidly. Violence broke out and spread to the point where Sierra Leone was engulfed in 
civil war. Guinea then began hosting a combination of refugees from Sierra Leone and from Liberia. 
Guinea was able to remain peaceful for several years, but violence finally broke out in late 2000. 
President Lansana Conte provided support for Liberian refugees to organize and recruit to fight against 
Charles Taylor’s forces. This was based on Conte’s personal view of regional security because he blamed 
Taylor for a series of incursions from Sierra Leone and Liberia. At the same time, Guinean rebels chose 
to challenge Conte’s government, whose legitimacy had been declining. Finally, Côte d’Ivoire has a long 
history of hosting refugees. However, it was very peaceful until September 2002, when rebels in the 
northern part of the country demanded President Laurent Gbagbo’s resignation and new elections. The 
factors that have changed in Côte d’Ivoire have been related to domestic politics. Beginning in the mid-
1990s, politicians started emphasizing the concept of Ivoirité. This development led to a politicization of 
ethnic identities in a country with a large number of immigrants. Alassane Ouattara, who was the 
country’s major opposition figure, was repeatedly ruled ineligible to run in elections. The government’s 
justification was the claim that Ouattara was from Burkina Faso. By the time he was barred from running 
for office in 2000, people came to doubt the government’s legitimacy. Refugees were thus used as 
pawns in the country’s own internal struggles.194 
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E. Level of foreign support and intervention for refugees 
Uganda 1959-1964 
 The UNAR had enough diplomatic skill in the UN to make PARMEHUTU nervous in Rwanda, and 
some support from the Belgian government. Led by Michel Kayihura, the UNAR had several skilled 
petitioners making their voices heard at the UN. The UNAR also benefitted from the sympathies of 
Belgian Minister of African Affairs Auguste de Schrijver. Auguste de Schrijver had a strong admiration for 
Tutsi culture, and he expressed strong regret at seeing the Tutsis removed from power in Rwanda.195 
However, UNAR was not able to derive many benefits out of its diplomatic skills and connections beyond 
delaying the full transfer of power in Rwanda to PARMEHUTU. 
Uganda 1990 
 The RPF did not have many sources of foreign support. It did, however, receive assistance from 
the United States. Some observers of the situation would argue that the Americans trained the RPF and 
turned it into a successful fighting force.196 Gerard Prunier de-emphasizes the importance of American 
support though, pointing out that Paul Kagame and nine or ten other Banyarwanda NRA officers went to 
the United States at some point, as well as a larger number of officers from various Ugandan tribal 
origins, within the framework of a US military training program. However, Kagame and the other 
Banyarwandan officers were already experienced soldiers, so the training was not essential in terms of 
building military skills. As a sign of the low level of interest the United States actually had in the conflicts 
within Uganda and Rwanda, the CIA and State Department actually did not realize that one of the RPF 
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leaders was on US territory until several days after the RPF invasion of Rwanda had begun. They had to 
call Fort Leavenworth to request Kagame’s file.197 
 On the other hand, the RPF’s Hutu opponents in Rwanda had the staunch support of France, 
Belgium, and Zaire. These countries all assisted Habyarimana’s government when the invasion began. 
Their assistance was crucial in giving the Rwandan armed forces the necessary firepower to effectively 
repulse the invasion and force the RPF to retreat. The RPF did recover and become more successful after 
regrouping under Kagame’s leadership, but the support of France, Belgium, and Zaire for Habyarimana’s 
government certainly made it more difficult for the RPF to achieve its goals.198  
 The RPF was not formed through the will of any foreign powers. It received limited assistance 
from the United States, but it was primarily a movement that grew and organized within Uganda and 
with Ugandan, namely NRA, support. More foreign support could have made it easier for the RPF to 
achieve its political and military goals, but the decision of Banyarwandan refugees to militarize was 
made without the manipulation or intervention of any foreign powers. In this case, foreign support did 
not have much, if any, influence on refugee militarization.  
Burundi 1959-1964 
 Burundi was a stage for competition between the East and West in the Cold War. Specifically, 
China competed for influence in Burundi with countries like the United States and Belgium. China began 
to gain influence in 1963, when it received recognition from the Burundi government. The recognition 
came in response to a diplomatic trip between December 1963 and February 1964 that sought to 
establish relations between China and as many African states as possible.199 Furthermore, reports 
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circulated about Burundi officials dining with Chinese officials. China did have a large diplomatic mission 
in Burundi, with 24 officials in the Chinese embassy by November 1964.200 
 China also got extensively involved in providing military training, arms, and ammunition to 
Rwandan refugee leaders. China offered substantial technical and financial assistance to Burundi in 
October 1963. At least three groups of ten Tutsi refugee leaders went to China and underwent a short 
guerilla training course.201 Large quantities of arms and ammunitions were sent from China and other 
Communist countries to the Rwandan refugees. China sent thousands of dollars to the refugee 
leadership. Arms and ammunition were mostly unloaded through Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, and 
Zanzibar.202 
 Western countries competed with vigor. Belgium provided direct bilateral aid to Burundi of $7.5 
million in 1960, $6.7 million in 1961, $8.55 million in 1962, $5.13 million in 1963, and $5.66 million in 
1964. The European Commission became the other significant donor during this period. It provided 
$10,000 in 1960, $470,000 in 1961, $750,000 in 1962, $250,000 in 1963, and $1.36 million in 1964.203 
However, China was also providing substantial aid, and its contributions had fewer conditions than 
Western aid.204  
 The West allied itself with the Hutus in Ngendadumwe’s group, whereas China allied itself with 
Nyamoya’s Tutsi group and the refugees. This East-West competition contributed to the politicization of 
ethnic identities that I detailed earlier. Western diplomats began attempting to counteract Chinese 
manoeuvres in the region in early 1964. They did not want Communism spreading to the region. China 
                                                          
200
 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 391. 
201
 Ibid, 205. 
202
 Ibid, 227. 
203
 World Development Indicators 
204
 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 396. 
91 
 
was using Burundi to transport arms and ammunition to militant groups with Communist leanings in the 
Congo. A Chinese diplomat who defected to the West named Tung Chi-Ping commented:  
 ‘Because it is the gateway to the Congo, this small, under-developed, over-populated nation is 
 important in Mao’s long-range plans to dominate as much of Africa as he can. Before I was sent 
 to Burundi, I had been thoroughly briefed on the progress being made there and the plans for 
 the future. Again and again my superiors repeated Mao Tse-Tung’s statement: “When we 
 capture the Congo, we can proceed to capture the whole of Africa. Burundi is the stepping 
 stone for reaching the Congo.”205  
 At the same time, Western embassies were more numerous than Chinese embassies and the 
West had an extensive network of friendly organizations at its disposal. Western technical assistance 
missions, UN relief agencies, and the Catholic Church all have been involved at some point in shaping 
Western policies in Burundi. Fears of losing Belgian aid made the Burundi court reluctant to recognize 
China. Speculation also abounds about whether threats of economic sanctions from Belgium and other 
Western governments caused Burundi to sever diplomatic ties with China in January 1965. It is clear 
though that the West placed substantial direct pressure on the court to adopt pro-Western policies and 
supported local Hutu politicians to place pressure on the crown from within.206    
Tanzania 1994 
 The refugees in Tanzania did not receive foreign support to militarize or organize politically. 
Foreign involvement was instead limited to providing humanitarian aid. Beyond that UNHCR did work 
with Tanzania to repatriate the refugees in December 1996. Based on Rwanda’s threats to deal with the 
refugee population and eliminate its potential threat to Rwanda, this involvement of UNHCR, while 
contravening usual norms on refugee assistance and protection, may have helped prevent a Rwandan 
invasion of Tanzania. The repatriation also ensured that there would not be any refugee militarization in 
Tanzania. 
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 Since Zaire gained independence in 1960, it has also been a very unstable state. The American-
backed overthrow of Patrice Lumumba, and the international community’s support of, or at least 
indifference to, Mobutu Sese Seko have made it extremely difficult for the state to make any significant 
progress.207 With such instability, Zaire was not in the position to help the refugees. Humanitarian 
organizations would be completely responsible for the refugees. 
For many years, Gerard Prunier’s narrative of France’s intervention in Rwanda, code-named 
Operation Turquoise, was the leading narrative on French involvement in the Rwandan genocide and its 
immediate aftermath. Prunier argued that France deserves a lot of the blame for allowing the 
perpetrators of the genocide to escape Rwanda. In June 1994, France launched Operation Turquoise, 
sending 2500 men to create a safe zone in Rwanda and stop the fighting. These men were heavily 
armed. French troops brought over 100 armored vehicles, a battery of 120 mm. Marine mortars, two 
light Gazelle and eight heavy Super Puma helicopters and air cover provided by four Jaguar fighter-
bombers, four Mirage F1CT ground-attack planes, and four Mirage F1CRs for reconnaissance. The 
armada was deployed by chartering one Airbus, one Boeing 747, and two Antonov An-124s to 
supplement a squadron of six French Air Force Lockheed C-130s and nine Transalls.208 France also sent 
many highly skilled soldiers. Almost 300 Special Forces men participated in Operation Turquoise, more 
than had been deployed in any previous French operation.209 Prunier contends that all this firepower 
provided effective cover for Hutu politicians and military men to flee to Gisenyi and then on to Zaire. In 
Gisenyi, they received additional help, as 200 elite French troops entered Gisenyi from Goma and 
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prepared themselves to protect the town from RPF advances.210 The ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and Hutu 
politicians were thus able to stay organized and use Zairian refugee camps to regroup and prepare to 
retake power in Rwanda.211 Allan Stam and Christian Davenport have recently compiled evidence that 
Operation Turquoise was not a very important factor in allowing the Hutu génocidaires to escape 
Rwanda. Their data show that Hutu leaders fled Rwanda where and when they did more because of RPF 
troop movements than because of Operation Turquoise. The real impact of the French intervention was 
to convince RPF forces to advance from the positions they had been holding to finish off their conquest 
of Rwanda.212   
 The French government also consciously chose not to arrest genocide perpetrators during 
Operation Turquoise. France knew of several leaders within the safe zone it created, including interim 
president Théodore Sindikubwabo and three of his ministers. The French Foreign Ministry justified this 
policy by claiming that it was not within its mandate to arrest genocide perpetrators. “Our mandate 
does not authorize us to arrest them on our own authority. Such a task could undermine our neutrality, 
the best guarantee of our effectiveness,” it stated on July 16, 1994.213   
 During the refugee crisis that followed the Rwandan genocide, the NGO community and the 
United States government spoke very loudly about the problems Hutu génocidaires were causing. Fiona 
Terry, director of the France division of MSF at the time, writes extensively about abuse, misuse, and 
outright theft of aid that was meant for refugees.214 In December 1996, Assistant Secretary of State with 
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the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Phyllis Oakley gave testimony supporting this 
narrative: 
  “*Many+ of the Rwandan refugees were able to break free of the former Rwandan government, 
 former Rwandan army forces that had been intimidating them into remaining as refugees in 
 Zaire. To date, some 600,000 have returned to Rwanda, most in massive movements between 
 November 15 and 20. Almost all of these have now returned to their home areas or communes 
 where they are being registered and receiving a settling-in package of assistance that includes 
 two months worth of food. Remarkably, given the still very fresh pains of genocide, human 
 rights monitors have seen almost no cases of retribution.”215 
  
 The United Nations attempted to limit the amount of foreign support to militants. Its most basic 
action towards this end was its refusal to meet with the government-in-exile in order to prevent 
according legitimacy to it as a negotiating partner with the UN. Some contact with the government-in-
exile was unavoidable, as it was sometimes necessary in order to distribute aid or conduct certain 
activities within the camps.216 Moreover, on May 17, 1994, an arms embargo was imposed to try and cut 
off resources that were being used for violence. Unfortunately, the embargo was not unanimously 
obeyed. Invoices and air waybills document the arrival of weapons in Goma. A lot of the weapons 
shipments arrived before the embargo was imposed but after the genocide had begun. However, at 
least two weapons shipments arrived after the embargo was imposed. The British firm Mil-Tec 
Corporation was the source of the majority of the invoices. One statement of invoices shows eight 
flights between April 18, 1994 and July 18, 1994 worth $6,515,313. Payments only totaled $4,807,000. 
This left a balance of $1,708,313. Mil-Tec sent a letter on December 7, 1994, requesting payment of the 
balance, highlighting that the last payment had been seized in Cairo by the US government “due to the 
situation in Rwanda at the time.” An example of one shipment, on May 18, included 2500 AK-47 rifles, 
10,000 30-round magazines, 2,500 vests with magazine and grenade pouches, 2,000 60mm mortars, 
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255,360 rounds of 7.62 x 39 ammunition, 6 155mm mortars, and 102 RPG7 rockets. Officials from South 
Africa, Israel, Albania, France, and China have also been accused of being involved in arms deliveries to 
Goma.217 
 When Rwanda finally had had enough and invaded Zaire in 1996, it intentionally targeted and 
destroyed the refugee camps. The RPF-led government faced a harsh international outcry for destroying 
the refugee camps. Paul Kagame was unapologetic though. He stated: 
 “I think we should start accusing these people who actually supported these camps—spent one 
 million dollars per day in these camps, gave support to these groups to rebuild themselves into a 
 force, militarized refugees, and when, in the end, they are caught up in the fighting and they die 
 I think it has more to do with these people than Rwanda, than Congo, than the Alliance. Why 
 shouldn’t we accuse them?”218 
Some Westerners had a more sympathetic view to the RPF. Those who had been involved in the efforts 
at humanitarian assistance were usually aware that the assistance all too often had contributed to 
refugee militarization. They knew that the situation was highly problematic, leading some public figures 
to express deep regret. One of these figures was Richard McCall, chief of staff of USAID, who ended his 
speech at the 1996 donor meeting with the following: 
 I am still haunted by the role that humanitarian assistance and humanitarian sanctuary in 
 Thailand played in guaranteeing the survival of the Khmer Rouge. We all tried to do the right 
 thing, but we accomplished the wrong result. Nearly twenty years later, the people of Cambodia 
 are still paying the price. The situation in the refugee camps, particularly in Zaire, is not unlike 
 the choices we faced 20 years ago on Cambodia. And I very much hope that we do not repeat 
 the same errors.219 
Pakistan during the Soviet invasion 
 Afghanistan began to acquire some significance in the Cold War in 1973. That was when a coup 
ousted King Zaher Shah, the long-time ruler of Afghanistan. Muhammad Daoud replaced him, bringing 
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with him a secular nationalist ideology. The coup brought about instability which pitted communist, 
nationalist, and Islamist forces against each other. This is when Islamist groups began establishing 
themselves in Peshawar, Pakistan. Afghan communists had brought Daoud to power, but his most 
important ally was the USSR. While ruling though, Daoud steadily pulled away from the USSR. This 
dynamic convinced the Afghan communist factions that they had an opportunity to seize power. In April 
1978, they staged a coup that brought Nur Muhammad Taraki to power. Taraki’s government then 
attempted to implement a series of reforms that was poorly received by the Afghan people. Because of 
this, he was ousted from power in late 1979. The precarious position of his replacement, Hafizullah 
Amin, convinced the Soviet Union to invade in December 1979 and install Babrak Karmal into power.220 
 In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. That invasion displaced millions of Afghans. 
Around three million of those Afghans fled to Pakistan, and around two million fled to Iran. The refugees 
fled to very different situations, and had wildly different outcomes. The refugees in Pakistan became a 
crucial part of the Afghan resistance to the Soviets, using assistance primarily from Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United States to undergo training and acquire weapons for that resistance.221 On the 
other hand, refugees in Iran lacked the capability to mobilize, and they were absorbed into Iranian 
society.222 
 Pakistan welcomed and actively courted international assistance to ease the burden of hosting 
refugees. More accurately, it expected substantial international assistance. This meant that when 
President Jimmy Carter’s administration offered $400 million in aid in early 1980, Pakistan rejected the 
offer. Instead, it waited until 1981 to sign a deal with President Ronald Reagan. The deal included the 
sale of the General Dynamics F-16A fighter-bomber to Pakistan, which was the United States’ most 
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advanced combat aircraft. By selling this aircraft to Pakistan, the United States alienated India a little bit, 
signaling an alliance with Pakistan that Pakistan found very important for its strategic and security 
interests.223 Furthermore, Pakistan estimated that the cost of maintaining the refugee camps was about 
$1 million per day. The government claimed it was covering about half of that cost, yet in reality the 
great bulk of relief came from UNHCR and World Food Programme (WFP) programs. Pakistan’s share of 
the assistance never came close to fifty percent.224 
 The United States began supporting Afghan rebels in July 1979 when President Carter 
authorized the CIA to spend just over $500,000 on propaganda and psychological operations.225 From 
there, American involvement only grew. It quickly got to the point where Howard Hart, the CIA station 
chief in Pakistan beginning in May 1981, understood the CIA leadership’s message to him as “You’re a 
young man; here’s your bag of money, go raise hell… Don’t fuck it up, just go out there and kill Soviets, 
and take care of the Pakistanis and make them do whatever you need to make them do.”226 Over the 
course of the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan, the United States spent billions of dollars in 
support of the Afghan mujahideen and provided enormous amounts of weaponry. 
 Saudi Arabia was also very active in supporting the mujahideen. Thanks to its massive oil 
revenues, Saudi intelligence had vast sums of money at its disposal, and it used a large portion of that 
money to support the mujahideen. Saudi intelligence officers were not necessarily renowned for covert 
operations like Mossad or the CIA, but its money made it an important player. Intelligence director 
Prince Turki al-Faisal once commented to a CIA colleague that “We don’t do operations… We don’t know 
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how. All we know how to do is write checks.”227 Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had a history of a clandestine 
and military alliance. Pakistani troops had been hired by Saudi Arabia for security deployments, and 
Saudi Arabia had provided air cover over Karachi during Pakistan’s 1971 war with India over Kashmir. 
Both countries were insecure and saw Islam as central to their identity. In July 1980, Prince Turki came 
to a formal agreement with the CIA to match congressional funding for the Afghan rebels.228 From that 
point, it is clear that both the United States and Saudi Arabia were taking an active role to arm the 
mujahideen. Aid was distributed through the refugee camps. The militants organized themselves there, 
and then they went back into Afghanistan.   
 Finally, private financiers played a substantial role in financing and supporting refugee 
militarization as well. The most well-known of these financiers is Osama bin Laden. These financiers 
pursued their own agendas and in some cases made quite a name for themselves. 
 It is important to note that there was not one uniform agenda among the financiers of the 
mujahideen and their support of refugee militarization. Collectively, they purchased and shipped tens of 
thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition to the mujahideen and turned them into large well-
armed fighting forces. However, they also spied on each other and pursued their own independent 
agendas. Some financiers were interested in promoting fundamentalist Islam to the refugees through 
the madrassas. The United States was fighting the spread of communism. Saudi Arabia had a mix of 
influences from people showing solidarity with their fellow Muslims who were suffering under the 
Soviet occupation to people hoping to spread fundamentalist Islam.229 In the end though, the cumulative 
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amount of money, weapons, and support provided to the mujahideen was extremely important in 
allowing the Afghan refugees to militarize to the extent that they did.   
Iran during the Soviet invasion 
 Iran refused international assistance for the refugees, placing it in stark contrast with 
Pakistan.230 As I discussed earlier, Iran did not want to rely upon the United States or any other foreign 
powers. It wanted to act independently and avoid becoming indebted to any other countries. Granted, it 
did a fairly good job of hosting the refugees. For instance, Iran actually had job opportunities for Afghan 
refugees that gave them a chance to integrate into Iranian society. This meant that foreign governments 
did not get very involved with the Afghan refugees in Iran. 
 
Broader Analysis 
 There is a common element between all of the cases of refugee militarization. Large amounts of 
humanitarian aid were provided to the refugees. In Uganda, Pakistan, and Zaire, UNHCR had large 
operations set up to assist the refugees. In other cases, UNBRO provided large amounts of assistance to 
the Khmer Rouge-led Cambodian refugees and UNRWA has run humanitarian assistance for Palestinian 
refugees since its creation in 1948. On the other hand, Iran is the only receiving state in my case studies 
that actually refused international assistance for hosting refugees. This means that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance has not necessarily caused refugee militarization. Since it does always appear to 
be present when refugee militarization occurs and is sometimes present when refugee militarization 
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does not occur, there does appear to be evidence for humanitarian assistance being a necessary 
condition for refugee militarization. 231  
 There are some cases, such as in Pakistan with Afghan refugees, where foreign powers directly 
provided resources for refugee militarization. However, there is not yet any convincing evidence that 
direct foreign support for refugee militarization actually caused refugee militarization to occur when it 
otherwise would not have occurred. It is also neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for refugee 
militarization because there are several cases of refugee militarization, like with Rwandan refugees in 
Zaire, where there was no direct foreign support for refugee militarization. Therefore, foreign support 
for refugee militarization should not be considered causes of refugee militarization until more evidence 
is found and better arguments are made. If there is a stronger connection to be made than what I have 
found, then the new evidence will have to support it. 
 
F. State Strength 
It should be clear by now that it is important to consider whether the receiving state or the 
refugee population is the most salient perspective from which to approach refugee militarization. Fikret 
Abdic’s Bosnian refugees present a case study that would indicate that the response of the receiving 
state is the most important to consider. The receiving state has the ability to prevent militarization of a 
refugee population that would otherwise militarize. However, a refugee population cannot militarize if 
the receiving state does not provide a conducive environment to do so. It remains unclear though 
whether the receiving state has to actively prevent refugee militarization or merely be unable or 
unwilling to prevent it. 
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Earlier sections have dealt with the preferences of the receiving states and the tensions within 
receiving states that may produce a supportive environment for refugee militarization. These sections 
have shown that receiving states tend to have some reason for wanting refugee militarization to occur 
when it happens. Yet, the case of Zaire also shows that a weak state may not be able to prevent refugee 
militarization even if it wants to. One very plausible argument would be that instead of there having to 
be some active cause for refugee militarization to occur, it could be that the receiving states must be 
able to actively prevent it from occurring. If the receiving state’s response is too weak to prevent it, then 
refugee militarization could occur. 
 Tanzania, despite its lack of wealth, was able to prevent refugee militarization by Rwandans 
fleeing the genocide in 1994. Shortly after the arrival of the refugees and their installation in the camps, 
the authorities brought in a police force to ensure respect for the law and maintenance of public order. 
This force was very small in relation to the number of refugees, yet its activities helped to minimize the 
number of incidents, for it arrested, detained and prosecuted trouble-makers. This was made easier by 
the fact that the refugee population in the Tanzanian camps was less politicized than in Zaire, where 
most of the leaders of the former regime had taken refuge. 
While it is difficult to find cases in history where the receiving state tried and failed to prevent 
refugee militarization, the Zaire case from 1994-1996 conveniently provides exactly that. It has been 
well-documented that Zaire’s state was extremely weak during the 1990s.232 Mel McNulty describes the 
Zairian state under Mobutu as non-functioning, except as “a milchcow for its rulers.”233 Zaire was 
extremely poor and was unable to provide basic services for its own people. Health centers in Kivu 
province, for example, had to be run locally without government support because of the state’s lack of 
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resources.234 This system was completely unprepared to host an influx of hundreds of thousands of 
Rwandan refugees. Within a matter of months, 50,000 people died from an epidemic of cholera and 
dysentery in the refugee camps.235 
Zaire did attempt to stabilize the refugee camps, but its efforts were largely unsuccessful, 
possibly even counterproductive. Beginning in early 1995, two contingents of soldiers were sent to the 
refugee camps. The first contingent had some success in improving conditions in the refugee camps. The 
second contingent was extremely destabilizing. It engaged in activities such as extorting money by 
levying taxes on refugees illegally conducting economic actions and taking advantage of refugees for sex 
or prostitution.236 It did not help that many policemen and soldiers had not been paid for several 
months. They were disorganized and were primarily concerned with their own survival.237 
There have been other cases where refugees arrived in countries that could not effectively 
control them. During the early 1960s, Burundi had very poor administrative systems in its government. It 
was not run effectively enough to reliably monitor and control the activities of the Rwandan refugees. 
Pakistan presents a slightly different situation because it effectively controls part of its territory, but 
Afghan refugees often settled in areas that the state did not effectively control. By the early 1990s, 
Afghan refugees had largely become concentrated in two parts of Pakistan. Approximately 75% of the 
refugees were in North-West Frontier Province, and about 20% were in Baluchistan. Almost all the other 
refugees congregated in the city of Peshawar.238 Coincidentally, the North-West Frontier Province is the 
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most weakly controlled part of Pakistan. This would have made it extremely difficult for Pakistan to 
prevent refugee militarization even if it had wanted to do so. 
To test the relationship between state strength of the receiving state and refugee militarization, 
I will use selected variables from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data set that can 
proxy state strength. 239 These variables include the percentage of the labor force made up by armed 
forces personnel, the total number of armed forces personnel, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, 
military expenditure as a percentage of central government expenditure, population density, 
percentage of roads that are paved, and the number of telephone lines per 100 people. Together, these 
variables create a picture of the receiving state’s level of infrastructure, ability to acquire resources, 
manage its territory and resources, and provide security. 
Each of these variables has been deliberately chosen. The two variables relating to armed forces 
personnel are meant to show the size of each country’s armed forces and their relative participation 
rates in their respective armed forces. The military expenditure variable demonstrates the central 
government’s level of commitment to having a strong military. As the percentage of the central 
government’s expenditure involving the military increases, one would expect that the government’s 
level of commitment to national security is increasing. This relationship should be taken loosely though 
because governments can also be expected to spend more of their money on the military if they are at 
war, their neighbors are at war, or there are any other significant threats to security. Therefore, the best 
way to conceptualize this variable is that the expected relationship of commitment to national security 
and percentage of government expenditure on the military increasing together holds when the security 
outlook is held constant. The relevance to this paper’s analysis of state strength is that countries with 
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higher amounts of their budgets spent on the armed forces should be more capable of providing 
security, holding all other factors constant. Population density indicates how much difficulty the 
government has in controlling its population. Low population density indicates that a country has a rural 
population. It can also indicate that there is rough terrain forcing people to spread out. These 
characteristics can make it more difficult for the government to provide security for its population. A 
country with low population density may also have a harder time preventing refugee militarization. The 
roads paved and telephone lines variables are both indicators of the level of infrastructure. The 
telephone lines variable is somewhat problematic because many countries, particularly African 
countries, often skipped installing telephone lines and went straight to cell phones. Cell phones started 
taking hold in Africa in the mid to late 1990s, so this observation is not relevant for many of the data 
values in my data set.240 
  The GDP per capita measure serves as a measure of the state’s ability to acquire resources to 
perform functions like raising an army, develop an effective police force, and develop an effective 
bureaucracy. The amount of growth from year to year in GDP per capita shows the direction in which 
the economy is moving. Solid growth in GDP per capita generally shows that the economy is doing well, 
people are making more money, and the government’s leadership is managing the economy well.241 
Effective government leadership can increase its legitimacy, thereby increasing its ability to govern. 
Fearon and Laitin use per capita GDP as a proxy for state strength in their discussion of civil wars and 
insurgencies, and their analysis remains applicable for refugees. They write: 
Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency, however, are the government’s 
police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas. 
Insurgents are better able to survive and prosper if the government and  military they oppose 
                                                          
240
 William Jack and Tavneet Suri, “The Economics of M-PESA,” MIT Sloan, August 2010, 4.  
241
 Of course, these are generalizations. Situations could plausibly arise where, for example, an economy is 
experiencing high levels of growth without the benefit of sound government policies. However, these 
generalizations are usually true when a country is experiencing high levels of growth. 
105 
 
are rather weak—badly financed, organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly 
informed about goings-on at the local level.242 
 
 Their analysis is applicable to refugees as well. To demilitarize refugees and prevent them from 
militarizing, the receiving state must have sufficient police and military capabilities and effective 
institutions. A low per capita GDP means that the government is not likely to have substantial access to 
tax revenue. Also, the institutions of countries with low per capita GDPs tend to be ineffective or poorly 
developed.243 With poor institutions and a lack of resources, states with low per capita GDPs seem likely 
to be the hosts of the refugees who choose to militarize. 
The data I am using go from 1987-1998. This time span was chosen because it corresponds with 
research that documents specific cases of refugee militarization. Sarah Lischer pieced several sources 
together to document cases of refugee involvement in political violence from 1987-1998. Not everything 
included under her definition of political violence constitutes refugee militarization, but it is easy to sort 
out which of her cases of political violence do constitute refugee militarization.244  
The main countries identified by Lischer as hosting refugee militarization include the West Bank 
and Gaza (Technically, this is not a recognized state by the UN, but the entity remains important to 
specify for this study.), Pakistan, Uganda (both Rwandan and Sudanese refugees militarized), Ethiopia, 
Zaire, Lebanon, Guinea, and Ivory Coast. There are a few other cases of refugee militarization, such as 
Fikret Abdic’s Bosnian refugees, but these are the longest running cases during the 1987-1998 time 
period. This characteristic allows me to take advantage of as much data as possible in my data set. This 
is an important concern because the maximum amount of country years that I could have data values 
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for each variable is 96. There are not data values for every year in every country, so it is useful to have 
this long term perspective. 
For comparison between the selected countries that hosted refugee militarization and the rest 
of the world’s countries, I run t-tests for each variable. Statistical analysis is challenged by the dramatic 
difference in country years between the hosts of refugee militarization and other countries, but I 






Table 3: State 
Strength 
  
              
                              
  All     Militarization     No Militarization     Diff SE 
               
 
Mean SD N 
 
Mean SD N 
 
Mean SD N 
   
               
Armed forces personnel (% of 
total labor force) 
1.9476 2.405 1550 
 
0.8218 0.6201 50 
 
1.9851 2.4333 1500 
 
1.1633*** 0.3446 
Armed forces personnel 
(Total) 
164606 394710.3 1571 
 
189688 256231.5 50 
 
163781.5 398746.1 1520 
 
-25906.3 56744.85 
GDP per capita (Constant 
2000 US $) 
6501.609 10522.6 2152 
 
340.7306 307.5818 65 
 
6693.49 10627.88 2087 
 
6352.76*** 1318.54 
GDP per capita growth (% 
annual) 
1.1914 7.1358 2149 
 
-0.0231 5.5273 64 
 
1.2287 7.1772 2085 
 
1.2517 0.9054 
Military spending (% of 
central government spending) 
13.536 16.7524 440 
 
28.4785 10.015 12 
 
13.117 16.718 428 
 
-15.3615*** 4.8537 
Population Density (people 
per square km) 
341.9 1569.1 2285 
 
91.4966 98.9002 57 
 
348.306 1588.458 2228 
 
256.8095 210.4516 
Paved Roads (% of total 
roads) 
48.4919 33.0312 1322 
 
27.1407 16.995 27 
 
48.937 33.1408 1295 
 
21.7963*** 6.3972 
Telephone lines (per 100 
people) 
15.0983 18.0425 2310 
 
0.8942 1.2696 55 
 





              
               
               
               




Table 3 provides evidence that measures of state strength can be useful indicators of whether a 
country will be a host country for refugee militarization. The variables for armed forces personnel as a 
percentage of the total labor force, GDP per capita, military spending as a proportion of central 
government spending, paved roads as a percentage of total roads, and telephone lines all show 
statistically significant differences. The variables growth in GDP per capita and population density do not 
show statistical significance, but with P-values of 17% and 22% respectively they should not be ignored. 
With more and better data, these have a reasonable chance of becoming significant. The logic for why 
these variables should be statistically significant is compelling, so it is very plausible that future 
statistical analysis could produce significant results. It is reasonable that the total number of armed 
forces personnel would not be significant, so that result is understandable. 
The difference in armed forces personnel as a percentage of the total labor force of 1.1633 
means that the countries in the “No Militarization” category had a proportion of people in the armed 
forces 1.1633 percentage points higher than people in the receiving states on average. With more 
people in their armed forces, the “No Militarization” countries would have had a larger share of their 
populations ready to demilitarize refugee groups. The result for total armed forces personnel is most 
likely insignificant because it depends more on the size of the country and whether it is in a state of war 
or peace. These factors are not necessarily linked to refugee militarization. 
The results for GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth indicate that the “No Militarization” 
countries have stronger economies and better manage those economies. They have a GDP per capita 
that is $6352.76 higher than “Militarization” countries on average. They also have growth in GDP per 
capita that is 1.2517 percentage points higher on average. 
The percentage of central government expenditure devoted to the military indicates that non-
hosts are much less concerned about their security than hosts. The “No Militarization” countries devote 
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15.3615 percentage points less to their militaries on average. As I discussed earlier, this result is as 
expected because countries neighboring a country at war can be expected to devote more resources to 
their militaries. Moreover, the “Militarization” countries all had internal concerns of their own, so they 
likely would be devoting more resources to their militaries with or without refugees. 
The difference in population density indicates that “No Militarization” countries are more 
heavily populated. They had a population density that was about 257 people per square kilometer 
higher than “Militarization” countries on average. As explained before, higher population densities make 
it easier for countries to manage their respective populations. 
The paved roads and telephone lines results both indicate that “No Militarization” countries 
have substantially more developed infrastructures than “Militarization” countries. The “No 
Militarization” countries had about 22 percentage points more of their roads paved and about 15 more 
telephone lines per 100 people on average. These are dramatic differences that speak to the extreme 
difference in infrastructure levels between the “Militarization” and “No Militarization” countries. 
All this goes to show that “No Militarization” countries had better infrastructure, more 
resources, better leadership, and more participation in their armed forces than “Militarization” 
countries. These aspects cumulatively form a comprehensive picture of state strength. With such large 
differences along these variables, it seems that state strength of the receiving state is an indicator of 
whether a refugee population will militarize. Earlier sections have demonstrated the importance of 
preferences and tensions within the receiving state, but this section has demonstrated that state 
strength of the receiving state is a reliable indicator of whether a refugee population will militarize. 
There is surely a relationship between state strength, tensions within the receiving state, and the 




Table 4: State Strength vs. State Interests 
 Want to prevent militarization Do not want to prevent 
militarization 
Can prevent militarization - Tanzania in 1994 wanted 
to prevent militarization 
and, with international 
aid, had the capability to 
do so. 
- Iran in the 1980s wanted 
to and was able to 
prevent refugee 
militarization. 
- Pakistan in the 1980s 
might have been able to 
prevent refugee 
militarization. With the 
refugees largely going to 
the poorly-controlled 
North West Frontier 
Province, it would have 
been difficult for 
Pakistan to prevent 
refugee militarization 
even if it had wanted to 
prevent it.  
- Uganda in 1990 wanted 
to get the RPF out of 
Uganda, so it chose to 
support RPF-led 
militarization. 
Can’t prevent militarization - Zaire in 1995 
unsuccessfully tried to 
stop refugee 
militarization. 
- Zaire in 1994 did not try 
to stop refugee 
militarization. Mobutu 
even supported it. 
 
Parsing out how that relationship works should be an objective of future research. For now, that 
relationship is unclear. What is clear is that characteristics of the receiving state, more than 
characteristics of the refugee population, are crucial to study in order to understand the causes of 
refugee militarization. 
V. Implications 
 In light of these findings, countries and aid organizations should focus on the dynamics within 
the receiving state to decide how much their contributions will accomplish. The response of the 
receiving state and the manner in which it receives aid are key aspects of whether the aid will benefit 
the refugees, or whether it may actually harm the refugees. This is because the receiving state defines 
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how refugees settle (camps, integration into society, etc.) and how humanitarian assistance is provided 
to refugees. There is a lot of responsibility that receiving states are required to shoulder. With that 
responsibility, receiving states also have the authority to use a refugee crisis to its advantage if it so 
desires. 
 Of the many tasks that UNHCR recommends be carried out is screening of the refugees. This is 
meant to determine if they should actually qualify for refugee status and the protection that comes with 
that status or if they are combatants. If they are combatants, then receiving states are tasked with 
separating them from the refugees. This is a huge burden to delegate to receiving states, especially 
when taking into account that the majority of the world’s refugees are hosted by developing countries. 
For example, in 2001 developing countries hosted 14 out the world’s 15 million refugees.245 To address 
this concern, and to try and improve responses to refugee movements, a policy of burden-sharing has 
been promoted within the UN and UNHCR. Burden-sharing dates back to the Preamble of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention states that “the grant of asylum may 
place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and… a satisfactory solution… cannot therefore be 
achieved without international cooperation.”246 However, this policy has been extremely difficult to 
effectively implement. 
 On a broad level, burden sharing is primarily hampered by every state’s desire to minimize its 
share of the burden of hosting refugees. Hosting refugees is very expensive. International sources are 
often willing to contribute to humanitarian activities like providing medical and food aid, but they often 
overlook the security aspects of hosting refugees. Moreover, many humanitarian aid workers resist 
working alongside security personnel because they fear losing trust from the refugees if they are 
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associated with soldiers.247 Some have argued that hosting refugees can be a public good globally, but 
this is a difficult case to make. Instead, states will often seek to avoid contributing to the assistance 
effort for a refugee population.248 
 To those who argue that refugee militarization would occur less often if the international 
community did a better job of burden sharing, Zaire presents a striking example of how difficult that 
suggestion actually is. Of course, this is much easier said than done. Instead of listing all the challenges 
involved with getting the international community to collectively take responsibility for the security of 
refugees, the attempt to muster a peacekeeping force in late 1994 for the refugee camps in Zaire can 
provide an effective illustration. By October 1994, the international community knew that it had to 
consider options for intervention in Zaire’s refugee camps. The joint UNAMIR/ UNHCR mission in 
September-October 1994 failed to effectively identify the problems and potential solutions. Then, on 
November 30, 1994, at the request of the Security Council the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
consulted with states that would have the capability to contribute to a peacekeeping force of 5,000 
men. The force would aim to protect the storage and distribution of humanitarian aid, guarantee the 
safety of the personnel of international humanitarian organizations, and to enable refugees who wanted 
to return home to cross the border into Rwanda in safety. Sadly, out of 60 states consulted, only one 
state indicated a willingness to contribute to the force. This caused the operation to be abandoned. 
Another possibility was for the international community to train and supervise Zairian troops. Zaire 
offered 1500-2000 troops for this plan, but once again the option was not chosen due to the lack of 
international support. A third option included hiring a private company specializing in security matters 
to train and supervise Zairian troops. However, the final cost of this option would have been about $60 
million per year. Finally, with no other option, the Security Council supported Zaire’s offer to deploy its 
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troops to the refugee camps.249 As I have already shown, this deployment turned out to be unsuccessful 
at fully stabilizing the refugee camps. When a second contingent of Zairian troops was deployed, they 
arguably left the refugees worse off than they found them. However, due to the lack of international 
willingness to intervene, deploying Zairian troops was the only available option. This is not unique. It is 
exceedingly easy to find situations where the international community was unwilling to act collectively. 
 Hence, the current setup, relying upon the receiving state to protect and demilitarize refugees, 
does not work. The international community, loosely organized into the United Nations, has also proven 
itself to be unreliable at best in responding to refugee crises. So, what is the best way to prevent refugee 
militarization? That answer is not clear, but it is clear that the current system does not work. 
 With the realization that the current system does not work, this thesis echoes a common 
argument across much of the literature on foreign aid. Development economist William Easterly asks 
why, if providing enough aid is what it will take to end world poverty, the international community has 
not seen more results from the $2.3 trillion that has been spent on foreign aid over the past five 
decades. Easterly argues that as long as the West continues imposing its own development ideas upon 
others instead of letting countries develop in their own ways, aid will continue to yield disappointing 
results.250 Robert Calderisi, in his look at Africa specifically, argues that African countries need to address 
their home-grown dictatorships, corruption, and lack of open political systems and free press.251 
Calderisi and Easterly are in line with the general consensus on aid that it must be appropriate for the 
people it is intended to help. Too often though, foreign aid is grossly inappropriate. Still, there is no 
claim that foreign aid should end. Instead, aid must be improved and given in smarter ways.  
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 Stronger arguments to limit aid are made when it becomes linked to violence. The violence 
component, unlike in development efforts in peaceful countries, makes it possible for humanitarian 
assistance to do more harm than good. Peter Uvin discusses the link between aid and violence at great 
length in relation to Rwanda. He argues that “the process of development and the institutional aid given 
to promote it interacted with the forces of exclusion, inequality, pauperization, racism, and oppression 
that laid the groundwork for the 1994 genocide.”252 His argument becomes quite powerful when we 
recall that Rwanda began a civil war in 1990 that only officially ended with the Arusha Accord in 1993. 
During that time, aid was increased even though several prominent reports of human rights violations 
emerged from Rwanda. Furthermore, increasing amounts of that aid were put into state hands. This 
provided support for the Hutu-controlled government to maintain and increase its power. It was able to 
continue operating in a culture of impunity as aid organizations neglected to speak out against the 
problems in Rwanda. However, even Uvin admits that there is no reliable way to tell whether or not 
more serious consideration of the option to withdraw aid would have improved the situation, or at least 
made genocide less likely. Perhaps most importantly, humanitarian organizations did succeed in getting 
change when they publicly fought for it on a couple of occasions.253 
 The situation where the strongest case can be made to withdraw aid is when aid is being given 
specifically to refugees. Having been forced to leave their homes, refugees have also had to leave their 
home country, often putting them in a very dire position. As my analysis demonstrated, some refugee 
populations have well -organized political and military organizations that are adept at using this to their 
advantage. Cambodian, Rwandan, Palestinian, and Afghan militants are just a few of the groups who 
have successfully used international humanitarian assistance meant for refugees as substantial shares of 
their budgets. For example, ex-FAR militants were able to divert a large proportion of the estimated $1.3 
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billion that was meant for Rwandan refugees during the 1994-1996 period to support their military 
goals.254 With so many resources being used to prolong, intensify, or expand conflict rather than for 
their intended goal of alleviating suffering from conflict, the argument to withdraw or withhold aid from 
refugee populations gains credibility. Those familiar with the horrors that refugees often endure may 
consider arguments to withdraw or withhold aid from them cruel and immoral, but if the receiving state 
cannot produce an environment that at least discourages militarization, then withholding or 
withdrawing aid from refugee populations hosted by that receiving state may just be the option that 
does the most good.    
VI. Conclusion 
 The results from the analysis and review of various bodies of literature in this thesis have 
challenged many assumptions about refugees and suggested some new ways to think about refugee 
militarization. I argue, in a slight modification of Sarah Lischer’s framework, that dynamics within the 
receiving state are the most important factors in determining whether a refugee population will 
militarize. The type of refugee population can make militarization more likely, but it has a smaller role 
than the receiving state. The capability of the receiving state to prevent refugee militarization is 
important, but the interests of the receiving state are just as important, if not more so. Additionally, 
there is a necessary condition for refugee militarization that the refugees must be receiving 
international humanitarian assistance. With the rise of organizations such as UNHCR, UNRWA, UNBRO, 
MSF, and the ICRC, refugee populations can generally expect to receive international humanitarian 
assistance unless the receiving state actively refuses it.  
 I have explored the causes of a horrible phenomenon, and observed that the international 
community does not adequately understand how to prevent it. Misguided ideas have been circulated as 
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solutions for years. For example, the UNHCR recommendation to limit camp size to 20,000-30,000 
people was unsuccessful in preventing the militarization of Abdic’s Bosnian refugees and Rwandan 
refugees in Zaire. In fact, militants in Zaire were actually able to exert greater control over the smaller 
camps.  
 What has emerged is that receiving states can cooperate with the international community to 
prevent refugee militarization. Tanzania was able to prevent the militarization of Rwandan refugees 
despite the country’s poverty. It was able to do this because its leaders actively sought to prevent 
refugee militarization and it was willing to work with the international community to provide security for 
the refugees. In cases where the receiving state cannot or does not want to prevent refugee 
militarization and it is not willing to seek international assistance to do so, humanitarian assistance all 
too often ends up in the possession of militants. These are the cases where the best solution can be to 
withdraw or withhold humanitarian assistance. Otherwise, there is a dangerous risk of aggravating 
conflict. 
 Of course, pursuing this policy suggestion would force the international community to endure 
horror stories of what has happened to refugees, and the condemnation that would inevitably result 
from not doing everything possible to help in the short term. This condemnation would be filled with the 
stories of refugees who have lived through terrible events, including people like Marie Umutesi, a 
Rwandan Hutu refugee who tells the story of running from ex-FAR soldiers: 
 When people began to run in all directions, sweeping before them everyone who was in their 
 path, I tried to keep my balance and held tight to Zuzu’s hand, which was covered with scabies. 
 She in turn tugged at my hand saying, “Auntie, let’s run fast. If we don’t, they will kill us.” We 
 ran on, pushed from behind by those who followed, and hid in the closet huts, but there was so 
 much shooting that these were not safe either. We entered the forest by the first path we 
 found. After running for about a kilometer, those in front stopped abruptly, as if there were 
 something that had frightened them, and suddenly turned on their heels. We abandoned the 
 path and entered the depths of the forest. The branches struck our heads, and thorns and 
 brambles scratched our arms and faces. Happily, the other girls had followed me on this mad 
 dash. Under the dense cover of the forest we stopped to figure out what to do. We couldn’t stay 
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 hidden for too long, since we needed to eat and drink. Furthermore, the place where we were 
 wasn’t far from the road, and the rebels would find us during the first clean-up operation. Nor 
 was it a good idea to continue deeper into the forest, since we were unfamiliar with the area. I 
 decided to retrace our steps and try to find a shallow spot along the river where we could wade  
 across. The water came up to my chest. I feel dizzy when I walk in water, and Marcelline held my 
 hand so that I would not fall and drown. A man who was with us offered to carry Zuzu to the 
 other side, since she was in danger of being swept away by the current, which was quite strong 
 there. 
 When we finally reached Lubutu, we realized that two children were missing, a boy who left 
 Tingi-Tingi with us and a four-year-old girl I had picked up the night before who had been 
 separated from her mother in the confusion. I had entrusted her to Virginie. When we were 
 running through the forest she let go of Virginie’s hand and was lost in the crowd. As for the 
 boy, Assumpta was the person responsible for him. She had succeeded in keeping him with her 
 since Tingi-Tingi, in spite of the commotion. However, when the shooting broke out, Assumpta 
 and the boy both fell, knocked down and trampled by the fleeing mass of people. When 
 Assumpta finally was able to get up, she tried to find the boy, but in vain. Later we continued, 
 unsuccessfully, to search for these two children. In light of the vast numbers of people who 
 perished at Lubutu Bridge, I don’t have much hope that they survived. During the shooting we 
 also abandoned a large part of what we had carried from Tingi-Tingi so that we could run faster. 
 We weren’t the only ones who had to abandon part of our provisions. Mountains of peas, corn, 
 flour, buckets, and blankets carpeted the road.255 
 Umutesi’s story and the thousands of others like it have been extremely effective at convincing 
people to open their check books and donate or convincing governments to provide humanitarian 
assistance. In the face of such hardship, human morality inspires people to want to act and provide 
humanitarian assistance. It is then easy to portray the decision to withhold or withdraw humanitarian 
assistance as being immoral. However, with the evidence of this thesis indicating that humanitarian aid 
has contributed to refugee militarization and made some refugee crises worse, withholding or 
withdrawing aid could actually be the most moral option in certain circumstances. As unconscionable as 
that sounds, it may just be the option that conscience demands. 
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